Vilvarasa v London Borough of Harrow

Under section 193(5) of the Housing Act 1996, the required information need only have been supplied before the applicant refuses the offer. It need not be given at the same time as, or coupled with, the offer of a particular property. Whether earlier information remains sufficient is a matter of fact and degree. A local authority’s additional finding that it is reasonable to accept suitable accommodation does not invalidate a subsection (5) decision where suitability independently satisfies the statutory test. The nature of an offer is fixed when made and cannot be retrospectively changed by later unilateral conduct.

The local authority accepted that it owed Mr Vilvarasa and his family the statutory duty to secure accommodation under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. It first notified him of the consequences of refusing suitable accommodation and later identified a particular property. He refused the offer and requested a review. The authority decided that the property was suitable and that its duty had ended under section 193(5).

His appeal to the Willesden County Court was dismissed by His Honour Judge McDowall on 19 March 2010. On further appeal, he argued that the notification was premature and that the authority had applied the test applicable to a subsection (7B) case, entitling him to refuse the offer without ending the duty. The central issues were whether section 193(5) had been complied with and whether the authority’s additional reference to reasonableness invalidated its decision.

1. Appeal dismissed. Judge McDowall had been right to dismiss the appeal against the local authority’s review decision.
2. Notification under section 193(5). The statutory requirement was that the applicant had been informed of the consequences of refusal by the time he refused the offer. The provision did not require the information to be supplied at the same time as, or coupled with, the offer of an identified property. Whether earlier notification remains effective is a matter of fact and degree. Here, the property was identified one month after the notification, with no intervening correspondence or events, and there was no evidential basis for concluding that Mr Vilvarasa misunderstood the terms or consequences. The authorities relied on by him did not support a stricter rule: Griffiths v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 160 and Ali v Birmingham City Council [2009] EWCA Civ 1279.
3. Nature of the offer. The nature of an offer must be determined when it is made. A valid subsection (5) offer could not be retrospectively transformed into a subsection (7B) offer by later unilateral conduct. The local authority had consistently treated the matter as a subsection (5) case.
4. Suitability and reasonableness. In a subsection (5) case, suitability was the relevant accommodation criterion. Reasonableness was additionally required in subsection (7) and subsection (7B) cases. The authority’s finding that the property was suitable was sufficient and was not challenged on the facts. Its additional finding that it was reasonable to accept the property was irrelevant and superfluous, but did not invalidate the decision. Ravichandran v London Borough of Lewisham [2010] EWCA Civ 755 was distinguishable because the authority there had expressly proceeded under subsection (7) and later sought to rely on subsection (5).
5. Irrelevant reasoning error. Applying Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [2009] UKHL 7, an administrative decision may survive an error in reasoning where the error could not affect the substance or fairness of the decision. The additional reference to reasonableness was such an error. The local authority’s duty had therefore ceased under section 193(5).

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) The further appeal was dismissed on 16 November 2010.
2. Willesden County Court His Honour Judge McDowall dismissed Mr Vilvarasa’s appeal from the local authority’s review decision on 19 March 2010.