Bridle v Bridle

In ancillary relief proceedings, an appeal from a district judge’s order is available as of right under rules 8.1(1) and (2) of the Family Proceedings Rules 1991. Permission from the district judge or circuit judge is unnecessary. The 14-day time limit in rule 8.2A(3) governs filing of the notice of appeal. Where notice is filed in time, the right of appeal is absolute. A circuit judge’s discretion to consider the merits arises when deciding whether to extend time for a late notice. A refusal of permission based on the mistaken contrary view must be set aside, with the substantive appeal directed to a judge who has not expressed views on its merits.

The husband appealed from an order of HHJ Tyzack QC in Exeter County Court. The order had treated permission as necessary to pursue an appeal from an order made by District Judge Dancey in ancillary relief proceedings. Wilson LJ identified that issue as the only good ground for permission to appeal. The Court of Appeal also noted that the sealed order appeared not to reflect the judgment concerning chattels. The central issue was whether an appeal from the district judge could be brought as of right, subject to the applicable time limit.

Disposition

The appeal was allowed. Lady Justice Black agreed with the judgment of Lord Justice Thorpe.

1. The circuit judge had proceeded on the mistaken view that permission was required to appeal from the district judge’s order. Under rules 8.1(1) and (2) of the Family Proceedings Rules 1991, there is a right of appeal against a district judge’s order in ancillary relief proceedings. That right does not depend on permission from the district judge or the circuit judge.
2. Rule 8.2A(3) requires the notice of appeal to be filed within 14 days. If the notice is filed within that period, the right of appeal is absolute. If it is late, the circuit judge has discretion whether to extend time and may take a general view of the merits when exercising that discretion.
3. The refusal of HHJ Tyzack QC was set aside. Since he had expressed forthright views on the merits, the substantive appeal could not appropriately be heard by him. The papers were to be transferred from Exeter to Bournemouth if necessary, and the appeal was requested to be heard by HHJ Bond, HHJ Meston QC, or another judge selected by the designated judge.
4. The appeal was not without merit because the district judge accepted that the sealed order did not reflect the judgment concerning chattels and indicated that he would address the mismatch.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed. The order of HHJ Tyzack QC was set aside, and the husband’s appeal was directed to be heard by another judge.
• Exeter County Court: HHJ Tyzack QC treated permission as necessary for the appeal from District Judge Dancey’s order and refused permission.