Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Scullion

For industrial injuries benefit, personal injury caused by accident requires proof of a causative event or incident distinct from the injury. A sudden, unexpected and catastrophic medical condition cannot itself constitute the accident without proof of an external event causing it. A claimant’s bodily activity may form part of an accident where it is allied to an external event or mishap. Where evidence contradicts the statutory deeming provision that an accident arising in the course of employment also arose out of it, the decision-maker must consider the evidence as a whole. A claim fails where no external event causing the injury is proved.

The Secretary of State appealed against a decision of the Social Security Commissioner dated 11 January 2008. The Commissioner had reversed a Social Security Appeal Tribunal decision dated 30 May 2006, which had upheld the Secretary of State’s refusal to make a declaration under section 29(2) of the Social Security Act 1998 that the respondent had suffered an industrial accident.

The respondent had suffered a cardiac arrest at work after a period of substantial work pressure. The issues were whether the cardiac arrest was an accident within section 94(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, and whether it arose out of his employment. The court also considered the effect of the deeming provision in section 94(3).

Appeal allowed. Pill LJ gave the principal judgment. Etherton LJ agreed with both judgments, and Aikens LJ agreed with Pill LJ while adding observations.

1. Section 94(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 requires a distinction between the accident and the personal injury. An accident is a causative event or incident distinct from the injury. The principle stated in Chief Adjudication Officer v Faulds [2000] 1 WLR 1035 was not confined to stress-related disorder.
2. The accident must involve an external event, although the claimant’s bodily activity may be allied to such an event. The unexpected resistance of a wheel, for example, could be relevant. A cardiac arrest is a medical condition and cannot itself be treated as the accident merely because it is sudden, improbable or unexpected.
3. The Commissioner therefore erred in treating the cardiac arrest as an accident and in treating the only remaining issue as whether it was causally connected with work. There was no evidence that any external event, whether or not allied to an action by the respondent, caused the cardiac arrest.
4. The second issue was not necessary to decide. However, under section 94(3), evidence to the contrary displaces the deeming that an accident arising in the course of employment also arose out of it. The decision-maker must then assess the evidence as a whole and the claimant must prove the employment connection. The evidence here was not all one way.
5. The court noted obiter that a common-law personal-injury claim may in some circumstances arise from stressful working conditions: Barber v Somerset County Council [2004] UKHL 13.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and restored the legal position that the cardiac arrest itself was not an accident under section 94(1).
2. Social Security Commissioner, on 11 January 2008, reversed the tribunal’s decision and held that the cardiac arrest could constitute an accident if causally connected with work.
3. Social Security Appeal Tribunal, on 30 May 2006, upheld the Secretary of State’s refusal to make the declaration.
4. Secretary of State, on 6 February 2006, refused the declaration sought under section 29(2) of the Social Security Act 1998.