Raissi v Secretary of State for Justice

Where a public authority has been ordered to reconsider an application, it must reach its decision within a reasonable time. Prolonged and unexplained delay may justify an enforcement order, even where the court does not decide whether the delay amounts to contempt. An authority cannot defer the decision indefinitely while awaiting an uncertain external investigation, particularly where that investigation is unlikely to assist on the decisive issue. Indemnity costs may be awarded where the authority’s subsequent handling of the matter shows a high degree of unreasonableness.

The appellant had previously obtained an order requiring the Secretary of State to reconsider his application for compensation under an ex gratia scheme for alleged miscarriages of justice. More than two years later, no decision had been made. The Secretary of State relied on continuing consultations, including an investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission and unsuccessful requests to the United States authorities for further material.

The appellant sought a finding of contempt and an order requiring compliance within a specified period. The Court of Appeal was asked whether the Secretary of State could await the IPCC report before deciding the application and what consequential order, including costs, should be made.

1. Enforcement order. The Court of Appeal ordered the Secretary of State for Justice to decide within 28 days whether the appellant was entitled to compensation under the second paragraph of the ex gratia scheme. The parties agreed that the earlier order required a decision within a reasonable time. The court did not decide whether failure to comply with such an order could constitute contempt because the appellant accepted the order made.
2. Reliance on the IPCC investigation. The Secretary of State was not permitted to await the IPCC report and then take further time to evaluate it. There was no reliable basis for the proposed three-to-four-month estimate. The IPCC had made at least four unsuccessful requests to the United States authorities and was continuing its investigation on the assumption that no further material would be received.
3. Complete exoneration. The court had grave doubts that the United States authorities could provide materially additional evidence. The existing evidence had been insufficient to justify the appellant’s continued detention after seven days, and the United States Department of Justice had informed the Crown Prosecution Service by 10 January 2002 that it would not provide evidence supporting the terrorism allegations. Further delay on this issue was therefore unjustified.
4. Costs. The delay was inordinate. A draft submission had been available since 28 September 2009, and further delay after 26 October 2009 was unjustified. The respondent’s handling of the claim from that date showed a high degree of unreasonableness. Costs were awarded on an indemnity basis from and including 26 October 2009.
5. Further observation. The court granted liberty to apply concerning whether a general election might prevent a decision within 28 days. It also observed, without having heard argument, that a decision under the ex gratia scheme might be quasi-judicial in nature.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in the present proceedings, required the Secretary of State to decide the compensation application within 28 days and awarded indemnity costs from 26 October 2009.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): on 14 February 2008, in [2008] EWCA Civ 72, ordered that the compensation application be referred back to the Home Secretary for reconsideration.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: proceedings CO/5091/2005 before Auld LJ and Wilkie J; the operative decision is not stated in the judgment.