Crawford v London Borough of Croydon

In a statutory appeal from a county court possession decision, the appellate court may entertain points of law but not challenges to factual findings or the weight assigned to evidence. A complaint that a judge failed to give proper weight to a consideration ordinarily raises factual judgment, not law. Hearsay evidence may support a possession order where the trial judge assesses its weight in the circumstances and the material is coherent, supported by other evidence and uncontradicted. A judge deciding what order is reasonable under the Housing Act 1985 retains a fact-sensitive choice as to the form, conditions and duration of the order.

The local housing authority obtained a suspended possession order against a secure tenant under grounds 1 and 2 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985. The county court found drug dealing and associated nuisance at the flat, held that possession was reasonable under section 84(2)(a), and made a three-year order subject to conditions.

The tenant sought permission to appeal on nine alleged errors concerning factual responsibility, hearsay evidence, earlier authority, changed conduct, health, the form and duration of the order, and the procedure used to settle its terms. Permission had been refused on other grounds. The central questions were whether paragraph 36 disclosed an appealable error of law or any procedural irregularity.

1. Disposition. Mr Justice Morgan, with Lord Justice Carnwath and Lady Justice Arden agreeing, refused permission to appeal. The tenant had no real prospect of establishing an error of principle or law.
2. Scope of appeal. The statutory limitation under the County Courts Act 1984 prevented an appeal on a question of fact. A complete absence of evidence capable of supporting a finding may raise a question of law, as explained in Moat Housing v Harris [2005] EWCA Civ 287. An allegation that the judge gave insufficient weight to a consideration instead challenges factual judgment.
3. Hearsay evidence. The county court judge was entitled to assess the weight of the hearsay evidence by reference to all the circumstances. The evidence was cumulative, coherent, supported by the police raid and aspects of the tenant’s own evidence, and was not contradicted. The judge’s ex tempore judgment showed that he had approached the evidence with care. It was not an error of law that he did not set out separately why each maker had not been called, applying the guidance in Moat Housing v Harris.
4. Possession order. The form, conditions and duration of an order under section 84(2)(a) involved a fact-sensitive judgment. Each case depended on its particular facts. Bristol City Council v Mousah [1997] 30 HLR 32 did not require an outright order. The judge had properly considered the tenant’s lack of direct involvement, the cessation of the conduct, his health and other relevant matters.
5. Procedure and correction. The tenant had been invited to make submissions on the precise terms of the order but had not challenged its three-year duration. The judge was entitled to proceed on the basis that the duration was uncontroversial and to settle the order in accordance with the draft, subject to correcting typographical errors. The erroneous recital that the parties had agreed terms could be corrected in the county court under the slip rule.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — The renewed application for permission to appeal on paragraph 36 of the grounds was refused. The court found no appealable error of law or procedural irregularity.
• Croydon County Court — His Honour Judge Ellis found grounds 1 and 2 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985 established, held possession reasonable under section 84(2)(a), and made a suspended possession order for three years subject to conditions.