Norris v Milton Keynes Council

Permission for a second appeal may be granted where a proposed ground is properly arguable and raises a question of general importance, even though the court has not determined the substantive issue. In housing suitability cases, it may be important to decide whether a decision offering accommodation can be supplemented or clarified by assurances given at a later viewing. It may also be important to decide whether an assurance dependent on a future assessment and possible adaptations is sufficiently certain, binding and enforceable to establish suitability. Those questions require consideration of the original decision separately from later events and of the threshold under CPR Part 52.13.

Angela Norris appealed under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 against a review decision that accommodation offered by Milton Keynes Council was suitable. The review officer accepted that Mrs Norris required a shower because of epilepsy, but considered the accommodation suitable because she had been assured at a viewing that adaptations would follow any occupational therapist’s assessment. His Honour Judge Serota QC dismissed the appeal in the Milton Keynes County Court.

On a renewed application, the Court of Appeal considered whether permission should be granted for a second appeal. The proposed grounds concerned the relationship between the Council’s original offer and later assurances, and the certainty required of an assurance relied upon to establish suitability.

1. Permission granted. The Court of Appeal granted permission for a second appeal on both grounds. The judgment determined only that the grounds surmounted the second-appeal threshold; it did not finally decide the substantive housing-law issues.
2. The first ground was properly arguable. The original decision was contained in the Council’s letter offering the accommodation, which made no reference to a shower. The later assurances at the property viewing might therefore be incapable of being treated as part of, or as supplementing, the earlier decision. Whether an offer or decision can be adjusted, explained or clarified by events at a later viewing was considered a question of some general importance.
3. The second ground proceeded on the alternative basis that the review officer could consider the later assurance. The relevant question was whether that assurance met the criteria described by Rimer LJ in Boreh v Ealing Borough Council [2009] 2 All ER 383, including sufficient certainty. Although the observations in Boreh had not been the subject of argument there, the proposed challenge to their ambit was sufficiently arguable and important to justify a second appeal.
4. The Court also recorded the proposed argument that the review officer should have treated the original decision as deficient under regulation 8(2) of the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999, thereby giving the applicant an opportunity to make further representations. The judgment did not resolve that issue.

The application was granted on both grounds of appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): on a renewed application, granted permission for a second appeal on both grounds.
• Milton Keynes County Court: His Honour Judge Serota QC dismissed Mrs Norris’s appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 against the review decision dated 11 February 2009.
• Review officer: upheld the Council’s decision that the offered accommodation was suitable.