Golubovich v Golubovich

Permission was granted to appeal a refusal to recognise a Moscow divorce. The proposed appeal raised a novel and plainly arguable question concerning the public-policy exception to recognition of foreign divorces. In particular, it concerned whether recognition could be refused where the foreign decree was pronounced in disregard of an English prohibitory order, despite procedural regularity in the foreign proceedings and the foreign court’s awareness of the English order. The Court doubted that non-recognition should be confined to cases involving obvious procedural irregularity or denial of natural justice. The merits were left open.

The parties had been involved in parallel matrimonial proceedings in London and Moscow. English orders prohibited the husband from taking further steps towards dissolution proceedings in Moscow. The husband’s Russian lawyer drew the Moscow court’s attention to the English order, but the Russian court subsequently pronounced a divorce decree.

The wife applied to Singer J for refusal of recognition on public-policy grounds. Singer J refused recognition, holding that a foreign court disregarding an English prohibitory order could not expect its decree to be recognised in England. The husband sought permission to appeal. The central issue was whether refusal of recognition was permissible despite the absence of procedural irregularity in the Russian proceedings.

The Court of Appeal granted permission to appeal. It did not finally determine whether the Moscow divorce should be recognised.

1. Thorpe LJ considered the appellant’s submission, relying on Bater v Bater [1906] P 209, that refusal to recognise a foreign divorce should be confined to cases involving an offensive feature in the foreign proceedings, such as obvious procedural irregularity or denial of natural justice. He expressed doubt that this submission was sustainable.
2. The proposed appeal was nevertheless plainly arguable. Singer J had refused recognition on the basis that an order prohibiting a party had significance beyond the domestic jurisdiction, and that a foreign decree pronounced in disregard of it should not receive recognition.
3. The English order had been before the Moscow court and had been drawn to its attention. Accordingly, the issue was not whether the husband had concealed the English court’s order by deceit or fraud. The proposed appeal raised the distinct question whether a divorce pronounced by a foreign court without procedural irregularity could nevertheless be denied recognition because it disregarded an English prohibition.
4. The issue had not previously been considered by the Court of Appeal. It involved the principles of comity and the interrelationship between jurisdictions, extending beyond the parties’ dispute, and was sufficiently novel and arguable to justify permission.

Etherton LJ agreed. Order: application granted.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal from Singer J’s refusal of recognition was granted.
• Principal Registry, Family Division: Singer J refused recognition of the Moscow divorce on public-policy grounds.