Townsend - Johnson, R. v

A deprivation order is part of the overall sentencing package. Although property may fall within the statutory power because it was used to facilitate offending, the court must still consider whether deprivation is justified on its merits.

Making the application within the statutory time limit does not itself justify the order. The court should consider the additional punitive effect, the strength of the connection between the property and the offending, and whether removal of the property serves any practical preventive purpose. An order should be quashed where those matters were not properly assessed and deprivation would add punishment without preventing further offending.

The applicant pleaded guilty at Worcester Crown Court to four offences of possessing false identity documents with intent. He received a total sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment on 31 October 2008.

Within 56 days, the Crown sought a deprivation order for false documents and the applicant’s computer. The applicant did not oppose deprivation of the false documents. The computer had been used in completing a passport application, but the merits of depriving him of it received little consideration at the later hearing.

On a renewed application after refusal by the single judge, the Court of Appeal considered whether leave should be granted to challenge the conviction, sentence, and the subsequent deprivation order.

1. The court granted leave out of time and allowed the appeal against the deprivation order. It quashed the order depriving the applicant of his computer. The court refused any continuing application for leave to appeal against conviction or imprisonment sentence.

2. Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 143, empowered the Crown Court to deprive an offender of property used for, to facilitate, or intended for use in crime. The computer was capable of falling within that category because it had been used in connection with the passport application.

3. That statutory power was discretionary. A deprivation order forms part of the overall punishment and must be assessed in the context of the sentencing process. The fact that the application was made within the extended 56-day period did not determine whether the order should be made.

4. The deprivation hearing focused on the time limit rather than the merits. The computer’s connection with the offending had not been examined in detail, and removing this computer would not prevent the applicant from acquiring another. Having regard to the additional punitive effect of deprivation and the absence of an ongoing preventive purpose, the order should not have been made.

5. The applicant’s complaint that sentence had been imposed while he was unrepresented failed. Under section 83, the statutory prohibition did not apply where an informed defendant declined representation. The sentencing judge had repeatedly offered legal representation, which the applicant declined.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Granted leave out of time to appeal against the deprivation order, treated the renewed application as the appeal, and quashed that order. It refused any application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
• Crown Court at Worcester: The applicant pleaded guilty on 29 September 2008 and was sentenced on 31 October 2008 to 27 months’ imprisonment. On 18 December 2008, the same judge made a deprivation order concerning the applicant’s computer.