Greig, R. v

On a submission of no case based on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge asks whether the prosecution inference is properly open to a jury. The prosecution need not exclude every other possible inference at that stage. The jury must nevertheless consider all the evidence with appropriate care and may convict only if sure that the prosecution inference is correct.

Direct evidence of a false representation is not essential. A jury may infer a dishonest representation from the surrounding evidence, including a marked disparity between the value of work and the payments obtained.

The appellant appealed, with leave, against his conviction for fraud contrary to section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006. The prosecution alleged that he and others dishonestly made a false representation to an elderly and vulnerable man that cheques totalling £6,850 were fair payment for gardening work.

No witness gave direct evidence of the alleged representation. At the close of the prosecution case, the judge rejected a submission of no case to answer. The appellant contended that the evidence did not permit a proper inference that a representation had been made, or that it concerned payment for the gardening work. The central issue was whether that inference was available to the jury on the circumstantial evidence.

Appeal dismissed. The conviction was safe.

1. At the no-case stage, the question for the trial judge was whether the prosecution inference was available on the evidence. The prosecution did not have to exclude every other possible inference. The appropriate approach to circumstantial evidence was to consider it as a whole and ask whether a properly directed jury could convict: R v P [2007] EWCA Crim 3216.

2. The distinct task of the jury was to decide whether it was sure that the prosecution inference was correct to the exclusion of other rational alternatives. The trial judge correctly kept those tasks separate.

3. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that the men had carried out gardening work, that the cheques were payment for that work, and that a representation had been made that the sums were reasonably due. The very substantial disparity between the value of the work, about £300, and the sums on the cheques was capable of supporting an inference of dishonest false representation.

4. The repeated attendance of the men at the complainant's home after the first cheque had been drawn also made the prosecution inference more probable than the alternative suggestion that the cheques had simply been stolen. The jury received the required directions and was entitled to reach its verdict.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appeal against conviction and held that the verdict was safe.
• Trial court not stated in the judgment: The trial judge rejected a submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution case. The jury convicted the appellant of fraud.