Gaviria v R

Under section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the two earlier meetings or communications need not be sexual. The statutory heading does not add that requirement. The provision can therefore apply where an adult has developed a relationship with a child through innocent or non-sexual contact and uses it as a platform for intended sexual offending.

The adult must, however, intend to commit a relevant sexual offence at the time of the intended meeting, or while travelling to it or waiting for it. A sexual intention formed only after an initially innocent meeting has begun does not engage section 15; liability then depends on any substantive or attempted sexual offence.

The appellant was convicted at Inner London Crown Court of sexual assault on a child under 13, contrary to section 7(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and of meeting the child following sexual grooming, contrary to section 15(1). He was acquitted of four further sexual-assault counts.

He appealed only against the section 15 conviction. He contended that it was inconsistent with the acquittals and that the jury had not been properly directed on the time at which the requisite intention to commit a relevant offence had to exist.

The central issue was whether the statutory requirements were met and correctly left to the jury.

1. Appeal dismissed. The jury had been correctly directed and could properly conclude that the appellant intentionally met the child while intending to commit a relevant sexual offence.

2. Section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 does not require either of the two antecedent meetings or communications to be sexual. Although its heading refers to meeting a child following sexual grooming, the phrase does not occur in the operative provision. The word “etc” in the heading also confirms that it cannot confine the statutory language. The provision covers an adult who uses a relationship developed innocently or otherwise as a platform for sexual offending.

3. The requisite intention must exist when the adult travels to the child, waits for the child, or intentionally meets the child. It is insufficient that an adult who began a meeting without that intention later decides to exploit the opportunity sexually. In that event, section 15 is not engaged, although the substantive or attempted sexual offence may be committed.

4. The acquittals on the earlier sexual-assault counts did not render the section 15 conviction inconsistent. The earlier contacts need not themselves have been sexual. Independent evidence surrounding the collection of the child from school, entry into her home, the condoms, the child’s appearance, and the appellant’s conduct permitted the jury to infer the requisite intention at the intentional meeting.

5. The trial judge twice directed the jury to decide whether the appellant had the relevant intention when he intentionally met and communicated with the child at her school. That direction accurately identified the temporal requirement under section 15(1).

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction for meeting a child following sexual grooming under section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
• Inner London Crown Court: the appellant was convicted by majority verdict on 26 November 2009 of sexual assault and the section 15(1) offence; he was acquitted of four other sexual-assault counts.