Akinrele, R. v

A conviction is not unsafe merely because a co-accused may have given unreliable or false evidence. The decisive question is whether the remaining evidence independently and safely supports guilt. A Family Division fact-finding judgment reached on different evidence does not control a criminal jury’s verdict. Nor does a later judgment automatically provide fresh evidence for section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. A fair summing up must accurately reflect the evidence actually before the jury, including conflicting expert evidence, without requiring equal treatment of materially unequal evidential cases.

Akinrele appealed against his conviction for the murder of his infant daughter following a third trial before HHJ Clegg and a jury at the Crown Court at Ipswich. His co-defendant, Kelly Inman, was acquitted of murder and causing death, having pleaded guilty to allowing the death of a child contrary to section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.

The appeal alleged that the judge’s summing up was unbalanced, that his conduct gave an appearance of bias, and that the conviction was unsafe because Parker J had made adverse findings about Inman’s truthfulness in Family Division proceedings. The appellant also challenged the direction on intent. The central issue was whether the conviction remained safe independently of Inman’s evidence and the Family Division findings.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction was safe and was soundly based on the evidence before the jury.
2. The trial judge’s summing up was fair and balanced. He properly explained that the defence medical experts’ minority position did not make them wrong, and he fairly analysed their case. His treatment of the two defendants’ evidence reflected the different evidence adduced against each. There was no evidential basis to suggest that Inman’s family had assisted her admitted lie in the way found in the Family Division proceedings. The judge’s admission of the late medical evidence was also inconsistent with any suggestion of bias.
3. The jury could safely convict even if it regarded Inman’s evidence as wholly untruthful. Independent evidence showed deliberate injury, the appellant’s implausible and admitted false account during the 999 call, evidence of his previous violence, and his aggressive reaction to the child’s crying. Taken together, that evidence entitled the jury to conclude that he was guilty without reliance on Inman.
4. The court applied the distinction identified in R v Levy [2006] EWCA Crim 1902: Family Division and criminal proceedings have different functions, and a Family Division determination does not prevent a criminal prosecution. Parker J’s later judgment was not fresh evidence capable of admission under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It reaffirmed conclusions reached on evidence different from that before the jury, while the primary evidence on which she had relied was available to be called at trial. Different tribunals may reach different conclusions where they hear different evidence; there is no basis for preferring a judge’s assessment to the jury’s verdict.
5. The direction on intent correctly stated the law and did not invite an objective assessment of intent. No further ground undermined the safety of the conviction.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appeal against conviction for murder.
• Crown Court at Ipswich — at the third trial, HHJ Clegg and a jury convicted the appellant of murder on 5 November 2009 and imposed life imprisonment with a minimum term of 16 years less time on remand.