London Borough of Lewisham v D & Ors

Information produced by comparing a retained DNA sample with other samples is information derived from the sample. Its disclosure is therefore restricted by section 64 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. A local authority carrying out child-protection and care-planning functions is not investigating an offence within that provision. The statutory purposes must be read as a coherent progression directed to the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of crime. The court should not add a gloss by creating a general test for when information ceases to derive from a sample. Each item must be assessed on its own facts. Where the statutory prohibition leaves no relevant discretion, the children’s welfare cannot override it.

The local authority sought disclosure from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis of the results of DNA matching between four children and the first respondent. The application arose during care proceedings and followed an earlier judgment concerning disclosure between the criminal and family processes. The police, the Secretary of State for the Home Department and certain respondents opposed disclosure under section 64 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The central questions were whether the matching report was information derived from a retained sample and whether the local authority was investigating an offence for the purposes of the statutory exception.

1. Application dismissed. The DNA matching report and the record of the comparative analysis arose directly from the samples and were therefore information derived from a sample within section 64(1B)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Disclosure was prohibited unless it served one of the specified statutory purposes.
2. The court declined to define generally when information ceases to derive from a sample. Each item of information must be considered on its particular facts.
3. A local authority conducting child-protection responsibilities in care proceedings is not investigating an offence within section 64. The statutory scheme is directed to criminal investigation and prosecution, not to the local authority’s protective role.
4. The children’s welfare and the importance of establishing parentage could not override the statutory restriction, which left limited, if any, discretion.

First-instance application. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.