HM Attorney General v Edwards

An application under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 may justify restrictions on a litigant where the conduct is capable of falling within the applicable restraint-order test. An adjournment may be appropriate where a missing transcript could materially affect the assessment of the proceedings relied upon in support of the application. The mere desire to obtain legal representation, after ample notice of the hearing, does not ordinarily justify an adjournment.

The Attorney General applied for an order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 restricting Mr Edwards from litigating in his own or another person’s name. Mr Edwards applied to exclude a person connected with related litigation and sought an adjournment to obtain transcripts and legal representation.

The court rejected the exclusion application. It considered the litigation relied upon by the Attorney General, including related libel proceedings and existing restraint-related orders. A transcript of a hearing before Mr Justice Eady appeared potentially relevant because its order was difficult to reconcile with earlier orders. The central issue was whether the hearing should be adjourned and, if so, on what basis.

1. Exclusion application. The application to exclude Mr Paradise-Hirst was refused. The existence of pending litigation did not establish that privileged material required his exclusion from the present proceedings (para [2]).
2. Applicable section 42 principles. The court referred to Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR as setting out the appropriate test for a section 42 order. The conduct relied upon, particularly the proceedings involving Mr Paradise-Hirst and the substantial unpaid costs, was capable of falling within that test, although the merits of the Attorney General’s application were not determined (paras [5]-[6], [15]).
3. Transcripts. Transcripts of three earlier hearings were refused because the existing bundle contained sufficient information and obtaining them was unlikely to assist the administration of justice. The transcript of the hearing before Mr Justice Eady was directed to be obtained because the apparent routine adjournment order was difficult to reconcile with earlier orders and might assist the court determining the section 42 application (paras [10]-[12]).
4. Adjournment. The application was granted because the Eady transcript was relevant and its relationship with the earlier orders remained in doubt. The court would not have granted an adjournment merely to allow Mr Edwards further time to obtain legal representation, since he had received ample notice and had already had that opportunity (paras [3], [12]-[14]).
5. The question of costs of the hearing was reserved. The case was directed not to be listed before 23 May 2010 (paras [23], [26], [47]).