Corus UK Ltd. (t/a Orb Electrical Steels), R (on the application of) v Newport City Council

[2010] EWHC 1279 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2010] EWHC 1279 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
9 June 2010
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Planning law Judicial review remedies
Keywords
planning permission planning officer’s report material considerations gypsy traveller site flood risk permitted development rights undue delay quashing order good administration
Outcome
claim succeeded in establishing unlawfulness, but quashing order refused
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A planning officer’s report must provide sufficient information and guidance to enable the planning committee to apply the statutory criteria. It must fairly and accurately address material matters and consultation responses. A report which materially misleads the committee, or causes it to rely on an erroneous statutory duty, may render the decision unlawful.

Even where a planning decision is unlawful, quashing remains discretionary. Relief may be refused where reconsideration would cause substantial prejudice or be detrimental to good administration, particularly where the claimant has delayed and the permission is temporary.

Factual background

The claimant, an adjoining landowner, challenged the defendant local planning authority’s grant of temporary planning permission for a gypsy traveller site, including gates and a bin store. The challenge concerned alleged failures to consider material considerations, inaccurate reporting of consultation responses, errors concerning site works, flooding, contamination and statutory duties, and delay in bringing the claim.

The court granted permission to apply for judicial review and considered the substantive claim. It found several defects in the decision-making process, then considered whether a quashing order should nevertheless be granted.

Held

  1. Planning report. The court applied the principles in Oxton Farms, Samuel Smith Old Brewery (Tadcaster) v Selby District Council and [2001] EWCA Civ 781. A report is not construed like a statute, but it must provide sufficient information and guidance for members to apply the relevant statutory criteria. The report must also deal accurately and fairly with matters it addresses.
  2. The report materially failed in several respects. It inaccurately summarised the Economic Development Manager’s opposition, understated the Environment Agency’s recommendation that permission be refused, omitted an important qualification in the contamination advice, wrongly stated that the authority had a statutory duty under section 63 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 to allocate sufficient gypsy sites, and presented substantial unauthorised hardstanding works as an existing state of affairs. The committee therefore failed to have regard to material considerations and took account of an erroneous matter.
  3. The works carried out on the site were not authorised by Part 13, Class A of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995. The claimant also established Ground 3. The remaining challenges, including those concerning alternative sites, foul drainage, flooding policy and the conservation site, did not independently justify quashing.
  4. The court had a discretion whether to grant relief: Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed & Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617. Although the defects were material, it was impossible to predict the result of reconsideration. The interests of the Hendry family, the temporary nature of the permission and the risk of prolonged uncertainty militated against a quashing order.
  5. The claim was not brought promptly for the purposes of CPR 54.5, and the delay amounted to undue delay under section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Applying R (Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22, the court refused a quashing order both under section 31(6) and independently of it. Declaratory relief was left for consideration at hand-down.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Key cases cited

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