Leeds City Council v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Anor

In determining a housing appeal, an inspector must apply the development plan as a whole, but policies identifying the main or prime focus of housing development do not prohibit development elsewhere. A shortfall in the five-year supply of deliverable housing sites requires favourable consideration under Planning Policy Statement 3, but does not make permission automatic. The relevant considerations remain matters of planning judgment and balance.

An inspector need not quantify the precise housing shortfall if satisfied that anticipated supply is materially unlikely to meet demand. An affordable-housing condition may be imposed where it does not require a planning obligation or financial contribution. In an outline application, the amount of on-site greenspace may properly be left for consideration with layout at the reserved-matters stage.

The Council refused outline planning permission for 40 dwellings on a greenfield site at Yeadon. The application concerned access only, with other matters reserved. An inspector appointed by the Secretary of State allowed Libra Demolition Ltd’s appeal and granted permission subject to conditions.

The Council challenged the decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. It alleged failures to apply the Regional Spatial Strategy, Planning Policy Statement 3 and the Leeds Unitary Development Plan, errors in assessing the five-year housing land supply, and unlawfulness in conditions concerning affordable housing and greenspace.

1. Claim dismissed. The inspector had not erred in law in granting outline planning permission.
2. Under section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, the appeal had to be determined in accordance with the statutory development plans unless material considerations indicated otherwise. The Regional Spatial Strategy policies making cities and towns the main or prime focus of housing did not require all housing development to occur there. They permitted development elsewhere, subject to planning judgment. The availability of previously developed land was a legitimate consideration in deciding whether the Yeadon site should be released.
3. The requirement in paragraph 71 of Planning Policy Statement 3 to consider housing applications favourably where there was no up-to-date five-year supply did not require permission to be granted. The obligation to have regard to paragraph 69 considerations, including the spatial vision and regeneration, required a balancing exercise rather than treating any one consideration as decisive.
4. The inspector was entitled to treat the mechanism in paragraph 7.2.10 of the UDP as superseded by the later policy framework. A housing supply could be demonstrably short by the later mechanism without ceasing to be consistent with policy H3. He was also entitled to rely on the reasoning of the inspector in the Oulton and Rothwell inquiry. It was unnecessary to identify the exact number of deliverable homes. The material question was whether anticipated supply was likely to meet demand and, if not, whether the mismatch was significant.
5. The affordable-housing condition was lawful. It did not require Libra to enter into an obligation under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, nor did it necessarily require a financial contribution.
6. For a development below 50 dwellings, the UDP required on-site greenspace to be considered on its merits. The amount of greenspace could depend on the eventual layout. Layout included the provision and arrangement of open spaces and was therefore a reserved matter under article 2(2) of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995. There was insufficient evidence to justify refusing permission for want of a greenspace contribution.

The court indicated that the Council should pay the Secretary of State’s costs, subject to any written submissions seeking a different order, while Libra should bear its own costs.

The Council challenged the inspector’s grant of outline planning permission by an application to the Administrative Court under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The application was dismissed.