Noye, R. v

On a review of a life sentence under Schedule 22 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the court must consider the seriousness of the offence, the principles in Schedule 21, and the recommendations of the trial judge and Lord Chief Justice. The statutory aggravating factors are not exhaustive. Conduct such as carrying and deliberately using a knife in public, together with sophisticated efforts to destroy evidence and avoid apprehension, may aggravate the offence even where there was no clear intention to kill, no premeditation and an element of self-defence falling short of a defence. The court upheld the notified minimum term, subject to deduction of qualifying time spent in custody in England.

The applicant had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Home Secretary had notified him of a minimum term of 16 years. He applied under Schedule 22 paragraph 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for a shorter period before consideration for release.

He relied on alleged evidential difficulties, mental-health evidence, provocation, lack of premeditation, absence of an intention to kill, partial self-defence and time spent in custody in Spain. The central issue was whether the statutory review justified reducing the notified minimum term.

1. The application to reduce the minimum term was refused. The period to be served before the applicant could be considered for parole remained 16 years, subject to deduction of the 11 months and 24 days spent in custody in England.

2. Under Schedule 22 paragraph 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the court’s task was to decide whether the early-release provisions should apply after a shorter period than the notified term. In assessing that question, the court had to consider the seriousness of the offence, the general principles in Schedule 21, and the recommendations of the trial judge and Lord Chief Justice, applying the guidance in R v Caines and Roberts [2006] EWCA Crim 2915.

3. The court treated Schedule 21 as providing the relevant starting framework. If that Schedule alone had determined the term, the starting point would have been 15 years. The mitigating matters in paragraph 11 were no clear intention to kill rather than cause serious bodily harm, lack of premeditation and an element of self-defence falling short of a defence. Those matters had already been recognised at trial.

4. The aggravating circumstances were not confined to the matters listed in paragraph 10 of Schedule 21. Carrying a knife and being prepared to use it in a public place against an unarmed man, with knowledge of its potentially fatal consequences, was significant aggravation. The sophisticated destruction of evidence and avoidance of apprehension, together with the applicant’s previous serious conspiracy conviction, were also relevant.

5. Untested expert material challenging the trial evidence could not alter the factual basis established by the jury. The psychological evidence did not justify a reduction, among other reasons because the physical and mental well-being of prisoners was primarily a matter for the Prison Service.