Vickers v London Fire & Emergency Planning Authority

In construing an employment contract, the court must identify the meaning a reasonable person would give the document in its commercial and factual context. The phrase “unable to drive” ordinarily refers to incapacity, such as physical or medical inability, rather than lack of legal entitlement to drive. Where a contractual exception protects employees unable to perform a newly introduced requirement for genuine reasons, the exception may be confined to reasons beyond the employee’s control if that reflects the agreement’s purpose and background. A construction which would allow an employee to obtain contractual benefits by voluntarily failing to acquire the relevant qualification will generally be rejected where it frustrates the commercial purpose of the provision.

The claimant was a firefighter employed by the defendant. His contract incorporated the sixth edition of the Scheme of Conditions of Service of the National Joint Council for Local Authority Fire and Rescue Services, known as the Grey Book.

The Grey Book introduced a competency-based pay structure. Firefighters were ordinarily required to demonstrate competence in driving, but paragraph 7 of section 3 provided that an employee unable to drive for genuine reasons was to be regarded as competent in the role if competent in all other applicable functions.

The claimant lacked an ordinary driving licence and had not passed the relevant test. He claimed competency pay and sought a declaration that the absence of a valid licence was a genuine reason why he was unable to drive.

1. Construction of the contractual term. The proper approach was to ascertain the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person possessing the background knowledge reasonably available to the parties. The court applied the contextual and commercial approach explained in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896, while recognising that construction is neither uncompromisingly literal nor unswervingly purposeful, as stated in Arbuthnot v Fagan [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Reinsurance Law 135.
2. Meaning of “unable to drive”. In paragraph 7, “unable to drive” meant incapable of driving, for example for medical or physical reasons. It did not mean merely not entitled to drive because the employee lacked a valid ordinary driving licence.
3. Meaning of “genuine reasons”. In the context of the Grey Book, the exception was limited to reasons beyond the firefighter’s control. The contractual purpose was to increase the number of firefighters competent to drive fire appliances. Treating a voluntary failure to take or pass a driving test as a genuine reason would defeat that purpose and make the employer’s power to require driving effectively voluntary.
4. Disposition. The claimant was not entitled to the declaration sought. His claim for breach of contract was dismissed. The issue of damages therefore did not arise for determination.