Chodan v United States of America

For the statutory 14-day period for appealing an extradition decision, time runs by reference to the calendar day on which the Secretary of State informs the person of the order, not the precise time of day when notification is received. The period therefore expires at the end of the fourteenth day, counting the notification day as day one. The Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 do not govern the Secretary of State’s independent statutory decision under Part II of the Extradition Act 2003. References to rules in the appeal provision concern the manner of giving notice, not computation or extension of the statutory period.

The applicant was arrested following a request by the Government of the United States of America. A District Judge sent the case to the Secretary of State under section 87 of the Extradition Act 2003. The Secretary of State ordered extradition on 16 June 2010 and notified the applicant’s solicitors by fax at 15.54.

The applicant attempted to give notice of appeal on 30 June. The notice was refused as out of time under section 103(9). The central issues were whether the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 postponed the start of time until the next business day, and whether the 14-day period ran from the precise time of notification.

1. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal under section 104(1)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003.

2. Notification by fax satisfied section 100(1)(a). The court relied on Mucelli v Government of Albania, [2008] 1 WLR 2437, paragraph 57.

3. The Secretary of State’s consideration under section 93 and the resulting order under section 93(4) form an independent statutory process. They are not criminal proceedings to which the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 apply. Part 17 and the general provisions relied upon did not alter that conclusion.

4. Section 103(9) identifies the start of the permitted period by reference to the day on which the Secretary of State informs the person of the order. It does not identify a particular time. Accordingly, the notification day, 16 June, was the first day of the 14-day period, which expired on 29 June.

5. The reference to rules in section 103(9) concerns only the manner in which notice must be given. It does not displace the statutory calculation of time. The court followed the settled approach in Mucelli v Government of Albania, [2009] 1 WLR 276, paragraphs 72, 75 and 82, that the period could neither be extended nor curtailed.

6. The notice attempted on 30 June was therefore out of time. Mr Justice Wyn Williams agreed.