Georgiou v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government

An inspector exercising planning judgment is not required to accept unchallenged expert evidence. The inspector must take relevant evidence into account, but may rely on personal experience, expertise and common sense, particularly in assessing noise. Where the evidence is understood and the decision gives adequate reasons for the planning conclusion, the inspector need not provide a detailed critique of an expert report. A decision reached after considering the relevant matters will not be Wednesbury unreasonable merely because it differs from expert evidence.

The claimant applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an inspector’s decision on a section 78 planning appeal. The appeal concerned a condition requiring bi-folding shopfront doors at a bar/restaurant to remain closed, in order to protect nearby residents from noise nuisance.

The inspector had considered an acoustic report, residents’ objections, the premises’ permitted operating hours and the operation of the doors during a site visit. He retained the condition. The claimant alleged inadequate reasons and Wednesbury unreasonableness.

1. The application to quash the inspector’s decision was dismissed. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs in the sum of £6,200. Permission to appeal was refused.
2. The inspector had not failed to take the acoustic report into account. The decision letter showed that he had considered and understood the report, including its conclusion that ambient traffic noise would mask noise from the premises.
3. An inspector exercising planning judgment is not bound to accept an expert report, even where it is unchallenged. The authorities, including Kentucky Fried Chicken (GB) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1978] 1 EGLR 139 and Mason v Secretary of State for the Environment and Bromsgrove District Council (1984) JPL 332, recognise that the inspector must bring experience, expertise and common sense to bear on the planning issue.
4. That approach had particular force in relation to noise, described as a subjective field. The inspector was entitled to assess the likely effect of open doors, customer noise and amplified music, having regard to the site visit, the premises’ potential opening hours and the residents’ objections.
5. The inspector’s reasons were adequate. He was not required, in the circumstances, to undertake a detailed critique of the acoustic report or explain separately why the suggested quieter sound-system condition would not resolve the concern.
6. The decision was not Wednesbury unreasonable. Relevant considerations had been taken into account and the conclusion was one which a reasonable decision-maker could reach.

The judgment describes the underlying section 78 appeal to a planning inspector. The inspector dismissed the appeal and retained the planning condition. The High Court dismissed the claim under section 288 and refused permission to appeal.