Patel, R (on the application of) v Lord Chancellor

Exceptional funding for legal representation at an inquest requires a significant wider public interest. The applicant must show a potential for substantial real benefits to individuals other than the client, assessed against the inquisitorial nature of the inquest, existing legal representation and the assistance otherwise available.

The Lord Chancellor is entitled to a substantial margin of discretion when balancing that public interest against the expenditure of public funds. A judicial review challenge must be assessed on the information available when the decision was made. Undue delay may independently justify refusal of relief where granting it would prejudice good administration.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Lord Chancellor’s refusal to authorise exceptional funding for representation at the inquests into the deaths arising from the 7 July 2005 bombings, including the death of her former husband, one of the bombers. Funding had been granted to families of the victims, but refused to the claimant because the asserted public-interest benefits were insufficiently identified and her application was partly motivated by protecting her own reputation.

The claimant challenged the decision as irrational and unreasonable. The court also had to decide whether to extend time for the late application and whether relief should be granted in its discretion.

1. Funding test. The claim failed. Under section 6(8) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and the Funding Code Decision Making Guidance, the threshold for exceptional funding was high. The applicant had to establish substantial potential benefits for persons other than herself. The assessment had to take account of the inquisitorial character of the inquest, the Coroner’s legal team, the representation of the victims’ families and the availability of Legal Help.
2. Rationality and discretion. The Lord Chancellor was entitled to conclude that the claimant had not shown that separate funded representation would add public benefits. The court was confined to the information available when the decision was made. A substantial margin of discretion was appropriate because the decision involved elected ministerial judgment, allocation of public funds and the balancing of competing public interests. The reasons given were adequate because the correct test had been applied and the claimant could understand why the application failed.
3. Delay. The application was brought outside the applicable three-month period. The claimant had not pursued the funding appeal with sufficient urgency, despite the Coroner’s need to progress the inquests. Applying the approach in Andrew Finn-Kelcey v Milton Keynes Council [2008] EWCA Civ 1067, prompt action was imperative. Under section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, relief would in any event have been refused because delay would have caused substantial prejudice to good administration.
4. Discretionary relief. Even if the decision had been unlawful and time extended, relief would have been refused. The claimant had not identified evidence she could provide to assist the wider public interest, and the Coroner’s legal team and other interested parties could investigate the relevant matters. The application for judicial review was therefore refused.