Cooperative Group Ltd v John Allen Associates Ltd

A construction professional does not escape responsibility merely because specialist advice or design has been obtained. The professional may, however, discharge the duty to exercise reasonable skill and care by relying on a suitably qualified specialist, provided that reliance is reasonable in all the circumstances.

Relevant factors include the specialist’s appropriateness, the need for further professional or independent advice, warning signs, the client’s remedies against the specialist, and whether advice should have been obtained under a separate retainer. In assessing professional negligence, the court applies the standard of the ordinarily competent professional, judged by knowledge available at the time and without hindsight.

The claimant occupied a supermarket whose ground floor slab had suffered substantial settlement and differential movement. The defendant civil and structural engineers had recommended a ground-improvement scheme using vibro replacement stone columns, relying in part on advice from specialist contractors.

The claimant alleged breach of a warranty requiring reasonable skill, care and diligence. It contended that vibro replacement was inherently unsuitable, that the defendant had delegated its design responsibility, and that the defendant had failed to investigate, check or warn about the risks. The court also considered the admissibility and use of expert reports disclosed by former Part 20 parties, together with causation, remedial costs and trading losses.

1. Expert evidence. CPR 35.11 permitted a party to use an expert report disclosed by another party, including a former Part 20 party. The court retained control under CPR 1.1, CPR 3.1(2)(m), CPR 32.1, CPR 35.1 and CPR 35.4, but no separate permission was required merely because the report was used under CPR 35.11. The evidence could be relied on where reasonably required, although lack of cross-examination affected weight. The whole relevant report had to be considered, and the court could take account of relevant expert joint statements.
2. Professional standard. The relevant standard was that of an ordinarily competent structural and civil engineer exercising ordinary care and skill. The conduct had to be judged by what was known at the time, without hindsight.
3. Reliance on specialists. A construction professional did not divest himself of responsibility merely by obtaining specialist advice or design. Nevertheless, reasonable reliance on an appropriate specialist could discharge the professional’s duty. The court had to consider all the circumstances, including the specialist’s expertise, whether further advice or investigation was required, warning signs, the client’s remedies, and whether the professional should advise the client to obtain separate advice.
4. Vibro replacement was not inevitably unsuitable at the site. Properly designed and constructed treatment could have reduced settlement to an acceptable level. The defendant was entitled reasonably to rely on Keller’s specialist advice and was not required to undertake an independent geotechnical evaluation or obtain advice from another consultant.
5. The claimant’s liability case therefore failed. The court nevertheless held, on the assumed basis of negligent design, that damages for a construction professional’s negligent design required the claimant first to establish what would have happened with proper care. If the project would have proceeded, recoverable loss was the reasonable cost of remedying the defect less the additional cost that proper design would originally have required. If the project would have been abandoned, loss was measured by wasted expenditure.
6. Where several remedial schemes were available, the claimant could recover the cost of its preferred scheme if that choice was reasonable. Relevant considerations included comparative cost, the benefit obtained, the intention to carry out the works, the alternatives’ risks and the resulting effect on the property’s value.
7. The claim was dismissed. The court’s findings on causation and quantum were made on an alternative basis, since liability had not been established.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.