Bangert v London South Bank University

A university’s contractual relationship with a research student may include an obligation to act reasonably and in good faith. Additional specific terms should be implied only where necessary to give the contract business efficacy and where the parties’ intention is clear. Allegations that academic staff acted in bad faith require proof on the balance of probabilities. Evidence of disagreement, criticism, procedural error, frustration or an ill-judged private remark does not itself establish bad faith. A claim may also fail for causation where the claimant cannot show that the alleged breach caused the complained-of exclusion or loss, or that the relevant academic progress would otherwise have occurred.

Thomas Bangert claimed damages for breach of contract arising from the termination of his doctoral studies and exclusion from London South Bank University in November 2001. He alleged that university staff had acted in bad faith, conspired to remove him, obstructed his research, mishandled supervision and retaliated against complaints he had made about colleagues.

The dispute followed earlier unsuccessful challenges in the Administrative Court and the Court of Appeal, but those proceedings had not involved oral evidence. The present court therefore determined the contractual claim on the evidence given at trial, with the burden on Mr Bangert to prove his case on the balance of probabilities.

1. Implied terms. The parties accepted that the University’s Research Degrees Regulations formed part of the contractual framework. Any further term could be implied only if necessary in a business sense to give the contract efficacy and if, considering the whole matter, it was clear that the parties must have intended it. The court accepted the University’s submission that the relevant implied obligation was that the parties should act reasonably and in good faith.
2. Bad faith. The claimant failed to prove that any member of the University’s staff, individually or acting in concert, had acted in bad faith. Professor Marshall had provided guidance and later an honestly held assessment of the claimant’s conduct and academic prospects. His recommendation that the claimant complete a transfer report, and his later expression of frustration, did not amount to lobbying or participation in a campaign to remove him.
3. Dr Pervez’s emails referring to obtaining a statement and hoping to get rid of the claimant were ill-judged and impulsive, but the surrounding evidence showed continued attempts to supervise the claimant and obtain the required transfer report. The court found no conspiracy, deliberate obstruction, or knowingly improper breach of confidence. The instructions concerning the claimant’s equipment were directed to enforcing University rules and accommodating teaching requirements. Any adverse effect was mitigated by the technician’s decision not to remove equipment essential to the claimant’s work.
4. Professor Alford and the other proposed supervisors were entitled to require evidence of progress and a transfer report. Pressing a dilatory research student to produce work was a supervisory duty, not evidence of bad faith. There was no sufficient justification for an external primary supervisor, and the claimant’s refusal to accept proposed supervisory arrangements was unjustified.
5. Causation. In any event, even if bad faith had been established, the evidence concerning the disciplinary investigation made it unlikely that a different conclusion about exclusion would have been reached. The claimant had not shown substantial research progress after his ten-month report and had not demonstrated that he would have completed his doctorate absent the alleged breaches.

The claim therefore failed both on breach and on causation. No further hearing on quantum was required.

The judgment states that the claimant had previously made unsuccessful challenges in the Administrative Court and the Court of Appeal. Those proceedings did not involve oral evidence. No citations for those decisions are stated in the judgment.