Singellos v Singellos

In ordinary circumstances, testamentary capacity together with due execution permits the court to infer knowledge and approval of a will. Whether circumstances arouse suspicion is a fact-sensitive assessment, judged against the full relationship and background rather than by a checklist.

The capacity required for an inter vivos disposition is issue-specific. A gift of substantially the donor’s estate requires an understanding comparable to that required for a will. The Parker v Felgate principle may apply, with appropriate modification, to inter vivos dispositions. Capacity at the time of settled instructions may suffice where the donor later understands that the documents being executed give effect to those instructions.

The claimant sought to prove her late mother’s March 2008 will in solemn form. The defendant challenged its due execution and alleged that the deceased had not known and approved its contents. The defendant also sought probate of an earlier 1986 will.

The claimant further sought declarations that company documents implementing an inheritance tax scheme were validly executed. Some documents were signed when the deceased had capacity; others were signed later when she was physically weak and her hand had to be guided. The issues were whether the guided signatures were effective, whether the deceased had sufficient capacity on the later date, and whether earlier settled instructions could validate the transaction.

1. March Will. The court accepted the evidence of the attesting witnesses and held that the March Will had been duly executed in accordance with section 9 of the Wills Act 1837.
2. Knowledge and approval is ordinarily inferred from testamentary capacity and due execution. Whether circumstances arouse suspicion is a question of fact. The relevant circumstances must be assessed in the context of the parties’ relationships and the whole background, rather than by a checklist. The circumstances relied upon did not require affirmative proof, and in any event the evidence established that the will represented the deceased’s testamentary intentions.
3. Company Documents. The guided signatures were genuine signatures. The deceased wanted and intended to sign the documents, despite being unable physically to sign without assistance. The circumstances did not amount to non est factum.
4. The capacity required for an inter vivos transaction is issue-specific. The more complex the transaction, and the more extensive the disposition, the greater the required understanding. A disposition of substantially the donor’s estate requires understanding of the nature and effect of the act, the extent of the property disposed of, and the moral claims requiring consideration.
5. The deceased had that level of understanding when she instructed her accountant to proceed with the inheritance tax scheme. By 28 April she understood that she was signing documents giving effect to those instructions, but did not have the full capacity required if capacity had to exist at execution.
6. The principle in Parker v Felgate, as explained in Perrins v Holland, applies mutatis mutandis to inter vivos dispositions. The material questions are whether the donor had capacity when giving settled instructions, whether the documents gave effect to them, whether the instructions continued to represent the donor’s intentions, and whether the donor understood the act of execution. Those requirements were satisfied. The fact that the transaction involved multiple documents, or that instructions were given to an accountant rather than a solicitor, was immaterial.
7. The March Will was admitted to probate and the declarations concerning the Company Documents were granted.