Taunton Deane Borough Council v Packman & Ors

On an application for an injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the court exercises an original jurisdiction and must make an independent judgment. It must balance enforcement of planning control against the defendants’ private and family interests, including Article 8 rights, and grant relief only where it is just and proportionate.

Relevant factors include the flagrancy and duration of the breach, the planning history, environmental harm, the prospects of a different planning decision, the availability of alternative accommodation, and the hardship caused by removal. A recent adverse planning decision should receive judicial respect. A renewed planning application does not justify delay without an arguable material change in circumstances. Alternative accommodation need not be entirely satisfactory if its availability means that removal will not inevitably cause homelessness.

The Council, the local planning authority for North Curry, sought an injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 requiring the Holland and Smith families to remove their caravans from plots 8 and 16 at an unauthorised gypsy site.

The site had been subject to enforcement action, several planning inquiries, refusals of planning permission and an unsuccessful section 288 challenge. The defendants remained in occupation despite the enforcement notice. The Council offered permanent and temporary pitches elsewhere and sought to proceed despite a further planning application and a request for an adjournment.

The central issues were whether there had been a material change creating a real prospect of a different planning decision, whether the offered accommodation was sufficient, and whether an injunction would be just and proportionate.

1. Relief granted. The court granted an injunction requiring the represented defendants to leave the site. The precise terms could be addressed by further submissions if not agreed.
2. Section 187B confers an original jurisdiction. The court must exercise independent judgment rather than supervise the planning authority’s decision. It must balance the public interest in enforcing planning control against the defendants’ private and family interests, including their Article 8 rights. The injunction must be just, necessary and proportionate.
3. The breach was flagrant and prolonged. The defendants had remained for four years after the extended compliance date despite three adverse planning inquiries, the Secretary of State’s decision and the dismissal of a section 288 challenge. Persistent disobedience was a powerful factor supporting relief, although it was not automatically decisive.
4. The planning history deserved the full measure of judicial respect. The second Inspector had considered the lower plots individually and collectively, the cumulative effects of further occupation, precedent, highway safety, landscape, residential amenity, hardship, alternative sites and temporary permission. The defendants’ new application and planning consultant’s different view disclosed no arguable material change and no real prospect of a different planning decision.
5. Further evidence and an adjournment were unnecessary. The Otterford and Extension Sites were available, even if the defendants considered them unsatisfactory. Their availability meant that removal would not inevitably cause homelessness. The resulting hardship and disruption did not outweigh the strong factors favouring relief.
6. The history showed that the breach would continue until effectively restrained and that nothing short of an injunction would provide effective restraint. The judge was prepared, if necessary, to contemplate imprisonment for breach of the order.