Iceland Foods Ltd, R (on the application of) v Newport City Council

A compulsory purchase power conferred for a specified redevelopment purpose cannot lawfully be used for a different or collateral purpose. The relevant purpose is determined from the compulsory purchase order, statement of reasons and confirmation materials, and need not include delivery by a particular developer. A change in developer, funding arrangements or timing does not necessarily alter the statutory purpose. Implementing a compulsory purchase order is subject to Wednesbury review and must be undertaken fairly and reasonably. Where the authorised redevelopment remains achievable, implementation will not ordinarily be an unjustified interference with property rights.

The claimant challenged Newport City Council’s execution and service of a general vesting declaration made under the Newport City Council (Redevelopment of John Frost Square) Compulsory Purchase Order 2006. It sought to quash the declaration and notice, and a declaration that the land had not vested.

The claimant argued that the original developer’s financial failure and the resulting changes to funding and redevelopment arrangements meant that the declaration served a different or collateral purpose. It also alleged Wednesbury unreasonableness and an unjustified interference with its rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol. The central issues were whether the authorised purpose had changed, whether implementation was unreasonable, and when judicial review proceedings became available.

1. Claim dismissed. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted, but both grounds of challenge failed.
2. The compulsory purchase power was limited by the purpose for which the order had been confirmed. Applying Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] AC 1088, it would be unlawful to use the power for a different or collateral purpose. The confirmed purpose was a comprehensive redevelopment of John Frost Square involving mixed retail, leisure, residential and hotel uses, car parking, highway alterations and public realm works.
3. That purpose did not require the scheme to be undertaken by Modus. The evidence showed continuing progress towards redevelopment. The change in developer, the need for alternative funding, the removal of the hotel element and the proposed delay did not establish a new purpose. The Council was still seeking to facilitate the redevelopment scheme authorised by the order.
4. The court had jurisdiction to entertain a Wednesbury challenge to implementation. Norris v First Secretary of State & Another [2006] EWCA Civ 12 confirmed that jurisdiction, although the relevant passage may have been obiter. Executing a general vesting declaration was a draconian step requiring fairness and reasonableness. Nevertheless, the Council had not concluded that the redevelopment was inevitably unviable; it had concluded that alternative funding and timing were required. Implementation was therefore not unreasonable.
5. The inspector had already considered the property-rights impact. Because the authorised scheme remained achievable and implementation was neither unreasonable nor for a collateral purpose, there had been no later change sufficient to make implementation an unjustified interference with Article 1 of the First Protocol.
6. Under sections 4 and 6 of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declaration) Act 1981, the declaration itself vested title. The right to challenge arose when the declaration was executed. Service of notice did not create a separate right or postpone that date, although unusual delay in service could be relevant to promptness. The claim was brought within three months, but probably not promptly; that was not a sufficient reason to refuse permission.

Not stated in the judgment.