Otobo, R (on the application of) v Law Society & Anor

A judge is not required to recuse himself merely because he previously made a procedural order in related employment proceedings. Recusal requires a proper basis beyond disagreement with, or criticism of, that order. An adjournment may be refused where the application is unsupported by adequate evidence, representation could have been arranged earlier, and the overriding objective favours proceeding. Permission to appeal requires grounds and will be refused where there is no reasonable prospect of success or compelling reason for appellate intervention. A statutory appeal route cannot ordinarily be circumvented by judicial review.

The claimant brought three related applications concerning disclosure, interim relief and proceedings involving the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Law Society. He sought the judge’s recusal because the judge had previously made a procedural order in related Employment Appeal Tribunal proceedings. He also sought an adjournment to obtain representation by solicitors and counsel, permission to appeal the refusal of that adjournment, and permission to proceed with the substantive applications.

The court considered whether the recusal and adjournment applications should succeed and whether any of the three underlying claims disclosed an arguable case.

1. Recusal. The application was refused. The judge’s earlier order had merely stayed an employment appeal and directed the claimant to provide particulars and evidence of alleged bias in accordance with the applicable Practice Direction. The judge had made no substantive decision in the claimant’s affairs and had only limited involvement in preparing the appeal. The claimant’s disagreement with the order, and assertions that other practitioners regarded it as unfavourable, provided no proper basis for recusal.
2. Adjournment. The renewed application was refused. The original request had relied only on counsel’s other professional commitments. The claimant could not identify counsel or explain the asserted commitment, had had ample notice of the hearing, and had a substantial history of non-attendance and adjournment applications. The further material concerning separate proceedings by Paul Baxendale-Walker was not directly relevant. In accordance with the overriding objective, the applications should proceed.
3. Permission to appeal. Permission to appeal the adjournment decision was refused. No separate grounds had been supplied, and the court found no reasonable prospect of success or compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to intervene.
4. Underlying applications. The court refused permission in each of the three claims and concluded that there was no arguable case. It agreed with the earlier refusal of the disclosure application. The asserted breach of Article 6, reliance on R v AM (Cameroon) v IAT [2008] EWCA Civ 100, and reliance on equality instruments did not establish an arguable judicial review claim. In relation to the appeal under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974, the statutory appeal was the appropriate remedy, rather than judicial review.
5. The claimant was permitted to obtain a transcript at public expense. The three applications were refused.

The judgment itself records related proceedings before the Employment Appeal Tribunal and earlier decisions concerning the claimant’s professional disciplinary proceedings, but no appellate history of the present applications is stated.