YA(F) v A Local Authority

The Court of Protection may determine Convention-rights arguments brought under section 7(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and grant declaratory relief where the impugned acts were done in relation to a person lacking capacity. That jurisdiction is not confined to claims brought by that person. It may include Convention-rights claims by a family member affected by acts directed at the protected person. The Court of Protection also has power to award damages under the Human Rights Act. Section 8(2) is satisfied through the court’s general powers, including the powers conferred by section 47(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, rather than through the Human Rights Act alone. Practical convenience cannot create jurisdiction, but case management may prevent duplication and misuse of proceedings.

The mother and her adult son, who lacked capacity, brought claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 arising from the son’s removal from hospital and placement away from home. The claims relied principally on Articles 5 and 8, with aspects of the mother’s claim also relying on Article 6.

The defendants argued that the Court of Protection lacked jurisdiction over the mother’s claim and the son’s claim for damages. The son accepted that his damages claim should be transferred to the Queen’s Bench Division if that argument succeeded. The central issues were whether the Court of Protection could hear the mother’s Convention-rights claim, grant declaratory relief, and award damages under the Human Rights Act.

1. Convention-rights claims and declaratory relief. The application to strike out the mother’s claim was dismissed. Sections 7(1)(b) and 8(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, read with section 15(1)(c) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, enabled the Court of Protection to hear Convention-rights arguments and make declarations concerning acts done in relation to the son.
2. The expression acts done in relation to the person lacking capacity was not confined to acts of which that person was himself the victim. The relevant acts were directed at the son, but could also affect the mother’s family-life rights. A literal and purposive construction of the Mental Capacity Act permitted that wider jurisdiction, consistent with the Act’s secondary purposes and section 3 of the Human Rights Act.
3. Damages. The Court of Protection had jurisdiction and power to award damages under the Human Rights Act. Section 8(2) required consideration of whether the court had general power to award damages in civil proceedings, excluding reliance on the Human Rights Act alone. Section 47(1) of the Mental Capacity Act gave the Court of Protection the same powers, rights, privileges and authority as the High Court in connection with its jurisdiction. That provision supplied the necessary power. An alternative route was that section 47 also enabled the court to exercise High Court powers to award damages in contexts other than a Convention breach.
4. The fact that the Court of Protection principally exercised a welfare jurisdiction did not exclude damages. Nor could convenience or procedural economy confer jurisdiction. Those considerations did, however, support coordinated case management, including staying or transferring proceedings where appropriate.
5. The court did not decide whether a non-protected person required permission under section 50 of the Mental Capacity Act to raise Convention-rights points under section 7(1)(b), or issues concerning proceedings under section 7(1)(a).
6. The defendants’ application was dismissed. No transfer of the son’s damages claim was required. The court directed that the mother’s Human Rights Act claim and the son’s damages claim should be treated as before the Queen’s Bench Division for protective case-management purposes, with existing pleadings and evidence standing in those proceedings. Costs were dealt with separately.