Ifedha v Archant Regional Ltd

A libel claim may be struck out where the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds, is an abuse of process, or persistently fails to comply with court orders. The court may assess the pleaded damages against the facts admitted by the claimant. A claim based on wholly unrealistic loss calculations and repeated failures to cure fundamental pleading defects may properly be struck out. The statutory qualified-privilege issue need not be finally determined where the claim is already liable to strike-out under CPR 3.4(2).

The claimant brought a libel action concerning articles published by the defendant newspaper about his former swingers’ club and alleged licensing, drug and prostitution issues. He claimed substantial general damages, loss of earnings and exemplary damages. Several statements of case were defective, failed to identify the precise words and meanings complained of, and failed to provide an adequate schedule of damage.

The Master stayed the proceedings and directed the claimant to remedy the deficiencies. After further non-compliance, the claimant applied to set aside the stay. The defendant sought strike-out. The central issue was whether the action should proceed despite the repeated pleading failures and the claimant’s assessment of damage.

1. Application dismissed and action struck out. The claimant’s application to set aside the stay was dismissed. The defendant’s application to strike out the action was granted.
2. The Master was entitled to conclude that the statement of case disclosed no reasonable cause of action in its present form and that the proceedings were an abuse of the court’s process. The claimant had repeatedly failed to comply with orders requiring proper particulars, including a schedule of damage. Those failures engaged CPR 3.4(2)(a), (b) and (c).
3. The damages claim bore no reasonable relation to law or reality. Even assuming that the publications conveyed that the claimant was illegally operating a brothel, the recoverable general damages would fall within the recognised maximum for libel claims and would be a fraction of the sum claimed. On the claimant’s own admissions, the Master was entitled to regard the action as worth no more than a nominal amount, if anything.
4. The alleged loss of business was also unsupported. It was not credible that the claimant’s described customers would have ceased attending because of the articles, and the calculations of loss were entirely imaginary.
5. The court stated that “malice” for the purposes of section 15 of the Defamation Act 1996 meant conveying the defamatory meaning while knowing it to be false or being reckless as to its truth. It was an allegation of dishonesty requiring particularisation and proof to the applicable high standard. The claimant’s pleading did not disclose such a case.
6. The court considered that the claim would have had no real prospect of success even if another opportunity to amend had been given. That was an additional observation, not the basis of the judgment, which rested on the Master’s strike-out conclusion.

The judgment describes interlocutory steps before the High Court:

• Master Eyre: stayed the proceedings and ordered the claimant to remedy deficiencies in his statement of case. The stay was continued after further non-compliance.
• Sharp J: adjourned the claimant’s without-notice application so that the defendant could respond.
• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): dismissed the claimant’s application and granted the defendant’s strike-out application.