Ernst & Young Llp & Ors v Coomber & Anor

Summary disposal under sections 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1996 is appropriate where the claim has no realistic prospect of success and there is no sufficient reason for a trial. The court must consider the statutory factors, including the parties before it, evidential conflict, seriousness of the alleged wrong and whether a trial is justified. It should avoid a mini-trial where a defence is fact-sensitive, but may analyse the evidence where the essential case has been fully deployed and cannot realistically improve. The statutory procedure permits remedies beyond ordinary summary judgment, including capped damages, correction or apology, and injunctive relief. Repeatedly reformulated conspiracy allegations which substantially replicate claims already struck out may be summarily disposed of as an abuse of process. An extended civil restraint order is available for persistent claims or applications which are totally without merit.

Two related proceedings were before the court. The first was a libel claim by Ernst & Young LLP and five individuals against Chris Coomber and C2H Ltd concerning serious allegations published on a website and elsewhere. The second was a conspiracy claim brought by Mr Coomber, Dawn Burrus and two companies against 15 defendants, of whom Ernst & Young LLP, Geraldine Proudler and Olswang LLP applied for relief.

The conspiracy allegations substantially overlapped with earlier Chancery proceedings which Lewison J had struck out on 20 January 2010. An application for permission to appeal was refused by Mummery LJ and a renewed application was rejected by Gross LJ. Mr Coomber subsequently abandoned or failed to pursue the claims, but the represented defendants continued their applications for summary judgment, a permanent injunction, and an extended civil restraint order.

The central issues were whether the libel claim should be summarily disposed of under the Defamation Act 1996, whether the new conspiracy claim should be struck out or summarily dismissed, and whether an extended civil restraint order should be made.

1. Libel claim. The court granted summary disposal under sections 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1996. The statutory test substantially corresponded to the summary judgment test under CPR Part 24, although the Act provided additional remedies. The words were admitted to be defamatory, and there was no realistic prospect of a successful justification or other defence. The limited evidential conflict concerned publication and identification only. The court was entitled to examine the evidence because the essential case had been deployed and there was no realistic prospect of improvement at trial.
2. In applying section 8(4), the court found that the relevant defendants were before it, summary disposal was not inappropriate, the alleged wrong was serious, and a full trial was unjustified. It awarded £10,000 to each of the five individual claimants and £5,000 to Ernst & Young LLP. It continued Stadlen J’s interim injunction permanently. The parties were expected to agree a correction and apology; failing agreement, the statutory safeguard permitted publication of a summary of the judgment. No subsisting counterclaim required disposal.
3. Conspiracy claim. The court granted summary judgment to the first three represented defendants. The pleaded allegations substantially replicated the earlier discredited conspiracy claims and remained speculative and without a real prospect of success. Mr Coomber’s failure to comply with Master Eyre’s order provided an additional case-management concern. The claim was also liable to be treated as an abuse of process.
4. Civil restraint order. Under CPR 3.11 and Practice Direction 3C paragraph 3.1, an extended civil restraint order was justified because Mr Coomber had persistently issued claims and applications which were totally without merit. The order was confined to matters involving, relating to, touching upon or leading to the conspiracy proceedings. Other complaints to public bodies were treated only as background and were not relied on independently.