KJH v HGF

Interim privacy and confidence relief may be continued where the claimant establishes a high degree of probability that publication will be restrained at trial, and there is a continuing risk of disclosure.

Where threatened disclosure forms part of alleged blackmail, the court must balance privacy and confidence rights against freedom of expression while recognising the strong public interest in preventing and punishing blackmail. Anonymity, private hearings and restrictions on access or publication are justified only to the extent necessary to protect those interests and preserve the administration of justice.

The claimant applied, at a private with-notice hearing, for continuation until trial or further order of an interim injunction protecting private and confidential information. The defendant had notice but was neither present nor represented.

The application arose from an alleged blackmail involving threatened publication of stolen information. The court considered privacy, breach of confidence, freedom of expression under the Human Rights Act 1998, the requirements of open justice, and the need for anonymity and publication restrictions.

1. The interim injunction was continued until trial or further order. The evidence established to a high degree of probability that the claimant was the victim of blackmail involving threatened disclosure of stolen private and confidential information.
2. The claimant was likely to establish at trial that publication should not be permitted. The privacy and confidence claims were strong. There had been no waiver of privacy rights, the information disclosed no wrongdoing, and there was no public interest justification for publication.
3. The court applied the principles stated in DFT v TFD [2010] EWHC 2335 (QB) and considered the threshold for interim relief affecting freedom of expression under sections 12(3) and 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, following Cream Holdings v Banerjee [2005] 1AC 253.
4. The court treated the public interest in preventing and punishing blackmail as a substantial factor supporting protection of the claimant’s identity. The defendant’s freedom of expression rights were correspondingly weak on the evidence, although the position would require reconsideration if the claimant failed at trial.
5. It was necessary to derogate from open justice by holding the hearing in private under CPR 39.2(3)(a), (c) and (e), anonymising both parties, restricting access to the court file, and limiting publication of information about the proceedings to the contents of the judgment.

The judgment describes earlier interim orders granted by Eady J and continued on two occasions. No appellate history is stated.