Hayden & Anor v Charlton

A statement of case may be struck out for serious non-compliance with procedural rules or court orders where the breaches cause substantial delay or prejudice, form part of a continuing pattern, and lack a proper explanation. The assessment must give effect to the overriding objective, including equality of arms, proportionality, economy, and fair and expeditious disposal. Access-to-court rights do not prevent procedural rules imposing timetables where a claimant has failed to comply. In libel proceedings, prompt pursuit is particularly important because delay may prejudice the administration of justice and interfere with a defendant’s freedom of expression.

Richard Hayden and Rayden Engineering Ltd brought separate libel actions against Diane Charlton and Mike Carver concerning website publications about land, flooding, environmental damage, and alleged harassment. The defendants relied principally on justification or truth.

Following repeated failures by the claimants to comply with case-management orders concerning replies, disclosure, inspection, witness statements, and listing, Mrs Charlton applied for strike-out orders under rule 3.4(2)(c) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. She also sought variation of a later order providing for trial by judge alone, requesting a jury trial under section 69(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The central issues were whether the claims should be struck out and, if not, whether they should be tried by a jury.

Sharp J struck out both libel actions and entered judgment for the defendants.

1. The rules had to be interpreted purposively so as to give effect to the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly. Relevant considerations included equality of arms, saving expense, proportionality, the importance and complexity of the case, the parties’ financial positions, and expeditious and fair disposal.
2. Under rule 3.4(2)(c) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the court could strike out a statement of case for failure to comply with a rule, practice direction, or court order. The ultimate sanction was justified by the claimants’ deliberate and wholesale non-compliance, serious delay, absence of a proper explanation, repeated history of default, failure to engage with the applications, and the significant prejudicial and oppressive effect on the defendants, who were litigants in person. The fact that there was no existing unless order did not prevent strike-out.
3. Where serious procedural defaults required explanation, evidence was necessary to enable the court to assess the position rationally. Counsel’s submissions were not a proper substitute for evidence. The claimants’ asserted business preoccupation did not explain the repeated failures or the failure to respond to correspondence and pay ordered costs.
4. The court also applied the approach in Khilili v Bennett and ors [2000] EMLR 996 at [50] in rejecting the suggestion that procedural enforcement impermissibly denied the claimants their article 6(1) rights. The delay in pursuing libel claims could also, depending on the facts, support an inference of improper motive and abuse of process. Unprogressed libel proceedings raised important article 10 considerations, particularly where there was a marked disparity in resources.
5. Had it been necessary to decide the issue, the court would have varied the judge-alone order in favour of a jury trial. Nothing suggested that the actions could not conveniently be tried by a jury, and the relevant factors supported exercising the residual discretion in that way. The issue did not arise because the claims were struck out.

First instance. The judgment records earlier case-management orders made by Master Kay, Master Leslie, and HH Judge Mackie QC. No lower-court judgment was under appeal.