McLeish, R (on the application of) v HM Coroner for the Northern District of Greater London

A coroner has no general duty to disclose a post-mortem or other report before an inquest without an application, and no absolute duty to disclose where there is good reason not to do so. However, where an interested relative has clearly and repeatedly asked to be informed about the cause of death and available reports, those requests may amount to an application for disclosure under rule 57 of the Coroners Rules 1984. Fairness then requires the coroner to keep the relative informed, particularly where the cause of death remains unascertained and delay may remove the opportunity for further investigation. Article 8 does not generally confer a right to know the cause of an adult relative’s death in such circumstances.

The claimant’s adult son died suddenly in circumstances in which the cause of death remained unascertained. A post-mortem report and toxicology report were obtained, but the claimant was not told that they had been received or that the investigation had effectively ended. She later obtained the reports, by which time samples had been destroyed. The inquest resulted in an open verdict.

She sought judicial review, alleging breach of the common law and rule 57 of the Coroners Rules 1984, together with a breach of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issues were whether the coroner had been under a duty to notify her and whether her requests amounted to an application for disclosure.

1. Common-law fairness. The claimant’s repeated requests for information, considered in the context of her bereavement and the clear assurances given by the coroner’s officer, amounted to an informal application to be told when the reports were available and, if requested, to receive copies. The failure to notify her prevented her from making a timely and informed decision about further investigation, including possible exhumation or additional testing.
2. There is no general duty on a coroner to disclose a post-mortem or other report before an inquest without an application. Nor is disclosure automatic where there is good reason to withhold it. This judgment did not establish a general obligation to disclose reports, or even their existence, absent an indication that the interested person wishes to be informed. The duty arose on these facts because the claimant’s wish was unmistakably clear and the cause of death was unascertained.
3. The purpose of coronial legislation includes finding out how a deceased person came by his death. The unexplained delay adversely affected that purpose because the claimant lost the practical opportunity to seek further examination before relevant samples were destroyed. Cases concerning disclosure immediately before an inquest did not determine the position months earlier, but supported the importance of effective participation and fairness.
4. Rule 57. The claimant was a properly interested person and had made an application, albeit informally. The absence of payment of a prescribed fee did not defeat the application because no fee had been demanded and it would be unrealistic to expect an ordinary bereaved person to know that a fee was required or its amount. The defendant therefore failed to comply with rule 57.
5. The challenge based on Home Office Circular 30 of 1999 failed. The circular was treated as guidance or good practice concerning suspicious deaths, not an applicable policy creating the alleged obligation, and the point had not originally been pleaded.
6. The article 8 claim failed. The authorities relied on concerned personal identity, childhood records, burial of a close relative, or establishment of parentage. Those circumstances were materially different from a claim by an adult whose mother sought the cause of his death. The court left open the possibility that article 8 might apply in different circumstances.
7. The claimant obtained declarations for breach of the common law and rule 57. The article 8 claim was rejected. Costs remained between the parties, with the claimant entitled to detailed assessment of her publicly funded costs.

Permission to bring judicial review was granted by Cranston J on 20 March 2010 after an oral hearing on 30 October 2009. The claim was determined at first instance by the Administrative Court.