DE v AB

An appeal from a district judge’s financial provision order under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 is not a rehearing. Intervention is justified where the lower court acted procedurally improperly, considered irrelevant matters, ignored relevant matters, or reached a plainly wrong conclusion. The court may adopt a broad-brush assessment of financial provision and need not audit every item. It must, however, analyse in broad terms how the final figure was reached and stand back to assess its overall effect on both parents. Mortgage payments and general running costs may be reflected in a lump sum where they benefit the child, provided that expenditure is not double counted. A substantial housing fund may be ordered where necessary to secure suitable accommodation for the child.

The father appealed against a decision of District Judge Bassett Cross dated 25 March 2010 concerning financial provision for the parties’ child under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989. The district judge ordered the father to pay £85,000 towards the mother’s indebtedness and to provide a £250,000 housing trust fund for the child, making a total award of £335,000.

The father argued that the award was excessive, that the district judge had double counted expenditure covered by child support payments, and that the £85,000 lump sum lacked adequate explanation. The central issues were whether the district judge had adopted a lawful broad-brush approach and whether the overall effect of the award had been sufficiently analysed.

1. Appeal approach. Applying Cordle v Cordle [2002] 1 FLR 207, the appeal was not a rehearing. The court could intervene only for procedural irregularity, reliance on irrelevant matters, failure to consider relevant matters, or a plainly wrong conclusion. Fresh evidence was subject to the more liberal family-proceedings rules.
2. Statutory discretion. Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 conferred a broad discretion. The court was entitled to consider mortgage payments and general running costs as part of provision for the child, particularly where child support payments were inadequate. Such expenditure could not be counted twice.
3. Required analysis. A broad-brush assessment did not require a detailed accountancy exercise. However, some overall analysis was always required. The judge should explain, in broad terms, how the final figure was reached, identify the components of the lump sum, and assess the award’s effect on each parent.
4. Application. The £250,000 housing fund was justified and remained payable. It was to be invested in a property for the child and the mother, with any mortgage contribution by the mother not exceeding £250,000. The mother could select the property subject to the father’s approval, not to be unreasonably withheld.
5. The £85,000 additional lump sum had not been adequately analysed. Its effect was to leave the father with effectively little or no capital after the housing provision. That lacuna was plainly wrong, so the appellate court was entitled to exercise its own discretion. The father had already paid £40,000, and no further payment was ordered.
6. The appeal therefore succeeded only to that limited extent. The resulting total payment was £290,000. There was no order as to costs.

• High Court (Family Division): The appeal from the decision of District Judge Bassett Cross dated 25 March 2010 was allowed in part. The £250,000 housing fund was upheld, but the additional £85,000 lump sum was not maintained beyond the £40,000 already paid. There was no order as to costs.