Siraj, R (on the application of) v Kirkless Council & Ors

In reviewing a planning decision concerning inappropriate Green Belt development, the court must ask whether the harm caused by inappropriateness and any other harm is clearly outweighed by other considerations. A planning committee need not reproduce an inspector’s stage-by-stage analysis. Its reasons may be holistic, provided the relevant considerations and the conclusion are sufficiently clear. A decision notice may lawfully give a summary of reasons. Judicial review does not permit the court to re-weigh planning considerations or intervene merely because the decision might be regarded as unreasonable on its merits. A robust remark by one councillor does not establish apparent bias without evidence of a closed mind or a real risk that the decision was made on that basis.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Council’s decision to grant planning permission for an agricultural machinery workshop in the Green Belt. The Council treated the development as inappropriate but concluded that very special circumstances existed, having regard to the specialist nature of the business, customer requirements, difficulties at the existing premises and the absence of suitable alternatives.

The claimant argued that the Council had applied the wrong Green Belt test, failed to give adequate reasons, acted with apparent bias because of a councillor’s remark, and reached a perverse decision. The central issues were whether the decision-maker had applied the correct test, whether its reasons were legally adequate, whether the remark indicated a closed mind, and whether the merits justified judicial intervention.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Council’s decision was not vitiated by legal error, inadequate reasons, bias or perversity.
2. For inappropriate Green Belt development, the relevant question is whether the harm by reason of inappropriateness, together with any further harm, is clearly outweighed by other considerations so as to amount to very special circumstances. The two aspects of the inquiry need not be treated as rigidly separate: the factors making a case very special may overlap with those said to outweigh Green Belt harm. This approach was taken from Doncaster MBC v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and its approval in R (on the application of Wychavon DC) v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government.
3. A planning committee’s reasons are not to be subjected to the same line-by-line analysis as an inspector’s report or a ministerial decision. Here, the officer’s report drew the correct PPG2 test to the committee’s attention, and the decision notice identified the relevant factors and concluded that they constituted very special circumstances.
4. The reasons were adequate. A decision-maker weighing competing considerations may identify the relevant factors and state which way the balance falls. The statutory requirement for a summary of reasons did not require a staged explanation of why each factor received its particular weight.
5. The councillor’s remark was unfortunate but did not establish actual or perceived bias. The applicable question was whether the members decided with closed minds, or whether there was a real risk of that occurring. The remark was made by one member of a group of about twelve, and there was no basis for concluding that the decision was reached on a closed-minds basis.
6. The challenge to the merits failed. The weight and importance of the planning considerations were matters for the planning authority and were far removed from the proper scope of judicial review.
7. In the addendum, the court accepted that a decision notice must stand on its own when identifying the reasons given for granting permission. That principle did not prevent the court from considering the material before the committee when deciding whether the decision involved an error of law, and the notice itself contained adequate reasons.