Director of Public Prosecutions, R (on the application of) v Lancaster Magistrates' Court

Where an adjournment application in criminal proceedings is contested, the decision is a judicial one for the magistrates. A legal adviser may sanction an adjournment agreed by both parties, but may not refuse an opposed application merely because one party objects. The application should be placed before the magistrates before the trial date.

Where an invalid refusal of an adjournment leads to a dismissal, the court retains a residual discretion over relief. It should balance the interests of a trial on the merits, fairness to the defendant and witnesses, delay, efficient administration, and the circumstances causing the delay. A procedural failure and breach of a target do not automatically prevent a case being remitted for trial.

The Director of Public Prosecutions sought judicial review of decisions made in proceedings against a persistent young offender. A legal adviser refused an application to vacate a trial date because the prosecution witness was unavailable, and the magistrates later refused to entertain a renewed adjournment application. The prosecution then offered no evidence and the charge was dismissed.

It was common ground that the legal adviser’s decision and the magistrates’ refusal were unlawful and should be quashed. The central issue was whether the dismissal should also be quashed and the case remitted for trial, despite the delay, the defendant’s interests, and alleged failures by the prosecution and court administration.

1. Relief. The dismissal of the charge was quashed and the matter was remitted to the Youth Court for trial. The court exercised its residual discretion in favour of a determination on the merits.
2. Residual discretion. The court balanced the competing considerations, including the possibility of a fair trial, prejudice to the interested party, the delay, good administration, the overriding objective in rule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Rules, and the circumstances in which the delay arose. The delay was material, particularly because the defendant was a persistent young offender, but it was not decisive. Much of the later delay resulted from the defective process by which the adjournment issue had not been considered judicially.
3. Prosecution conduct. The decision to offer no evidence in the absence of the complainant and her principal supporting witness was correct and fair. Seeking a conviction through hearsay and an adverse inference from a 17-year-old’s no-comment interview, where he had legal advice, could have pushed the boundaries of acceptable prosecution practice.
4. Proper decision-maker. Under paragraph 7 of the Schedule to the Justices’ Clerks Rules 2005, a justice’s clerk or authorised assistant could sanction an adjournment where both parties agreed. That provision did not confer power to refuse an opposed adjournment. Because adjournment involved judicial discretion, a contested application should be listed before the magistrates for decision before the trial date. A practice under which legal advisers determined all such applications required reconsideration.

Not an appeal. The judgment arose from a judicial review of decisions by the Lancaster Youth Court and its legal adviser. The court quashed the relevant decisions and remitted the matter to the Youth Court for trial.