Moore v Holdsworth & Ors

Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, reasonable financial provision for a surviving spouse may be satisfied by a life interest rather than an absolute inheritance. The court must assess all relevant statutory factors, including the spouse’s resources and needs, disability, the deceased’s obligations, the estate’s size and nature, the beneficiaries’ circumstances, and the provision reasonably expected on divorce. A realistic and important need to remain in the matrimonial home may justify a life interest. It does not necessarily justify transferring the whole beneficial interest, particularly where the spouse’s care is publicly funded and the estate is modest.

Susan Moore applied under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 after her husband, Ian Moore, left his interest in their former matrimonial home to three beneficiaries and the residue of his estate to her. Susan had multiple sclerosis, lived in residential care and wished to return home with suitable adaptations and care.

The issue was whether the will made reasonable financial provision for her and, if not, whether she should receive the whole estate absolutely or a lesser interest protecting her accommodation needs.

1. The claim succeeded to the extent necessary to provide Susan with a life interest in Ian’s share of the property. She was to be permitted to live there for life, or for so long as she remained able to do so.
2. In applying sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, the court gave substantial weight to Susan’s severe physical disability, her long marriage, the mutual contributions made by the spouses, Ian’s responsibilities towards her, and her realistic wish to return to the home.
3. The medical and local-authority evidence established that returning home was practicable, subject to adaptations and a 24-hour care package. The proposed order therefore addressed a central accommodation and welfare need.
4. Reasonable provision did not require an absolute interest in the entire estate. Susan would receive the £40,000 residue and already owned her half share of the property. Her care was currently publicly funded, and the evidence indicated that a substantial part of the estate would otherwise be used for care and related needs. The court also considered Ian’s wishes and the interests of the intended beneficiaries.
5. The statutory divorce comparison supported a life interest, but not an absolute inheritance. If the marriage had ended by divorce, Susan was unlikely to have received the whole estate absolutely, although she would probably have received provision enabling her to remain in the property.
6. Ian’s interest in the property was therefore held for the intended beneficiaries subject to Susan’s life interest. If she could no longer live there, the proceeds could be used to purchase or contribute to suitable alternative accommodation, with a corresponding right for her to occupy it for life or while able to do so.

First-instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.