Hines v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Under section 16 of the Extradition Act 1989, the court may order discharge unless sufficient cause is shown. That assessment includes reasonableness in all the circumstances. The two-month period is a minimum period before an application may be made, not an outer limit for the Secretary of State’s decision. Diligent consideration of representations and necessary inquiries will not ordinarily amount to inordinate delay.

The applicant had been committed under section 9 of the Extradition Act 1989 to await the Secretary of State’s decision on Brazil’s request for his return. After his United Kingdom sentence ended, the Secretary of State considered representations, obtained legal advice and sought information about Brazilian prison conditions. The applicant applied under section 16 for discharge, alleging inordinate delay.

The issue was whether sufficient cause had been shown for his continued detention.

1. Application refused. The Secretary of State showed sufficient cause under section 16(5) of the Extradition Act 1989.
2. The phrase “unless sufficient cause is shown to the contrary” requires the court to consider reasonableness in all the circumstances. The court applied the approach in Re Oskar, following Re Shuter.
3. The applicant’s authorities concerned cases where no substantive decision remained and only administrative arrangements were outstanding. Here, the Secretary of State still had to decide whether to order return and was required to consider representations under section 13(4).
4. The Secretary of State had acted diligently by considering the representations, obtaining advice and seeking information reasonably necessary to determine them. The delay was not inordinate and was comparable to R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Enaharo.
5. The two-month period in section 16(2)(a) is a minimum period before an application may be made, not an outer limit for the Secretary of State’s decision.