Mihociu v Central Court of the District of Pest, Hungary

On an appeal under the Extradition Act 2003, delay bars extradition only where, viewed in its practical effect, extradition would be unjust or oppressive. Delay caused by the requested person cannot ordinarily found that bar. Article 8 requires a proportionality assessment, but interference with private or family life will outweigh the public interest in extradition only where its consequences are exceptionally serious. An abuse-of-process allegation must identify the impugned conduct precisely and show reasonable grounds for believing that it occurred. Convention countries are generally presumed to comply with fair-trial and human-rights obligations, and strong evidence is required to establish bad faith. On appeal, fresh evidence permits discharge only if it would have required the extradition judge to order discharge.

The claimant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a district judge’s order for his extradition to Hungary to face charges of forging public documents and making a false accusation of crime.

He relied on passage of time under section 14, incompatibility with Article 8 under section 21, and alleged abuse of process based on the Hungarian authority’s failure to disclose an earlier European arrest warrant and alleged misleading information. Fresh evidence concerning the history of proceedings in Hungary and Austria was admitted. The central issues were whether the statutory bars or abuse-of-process jurisdiction applied and whether the statutory conditions for allowing an appeal on new evidence were satisfied.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court considered the grounds separately and cumulatively and held that the statutory conditions for allowing the appeal were not met.
2. Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the appellant bore the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of delay. Applying Kakis v Government of Cyprus [1978] WLR 779, “unjust” principally concerns prejudice to the conduct of the trial, while “oppressive” concerns hardship resulting from changes in the accused’s circumstances. The relevant period began when the Hungarian authorities discovered the alleged impersonation, rather than when the offences were first committed. The delay was insufficient, in context, to engage section 14.
3. Section 21 required consideration of whether extradition was compatible with Convention rights. Applying Norris v Government of United States of America 2010 UKSC 9, the consequences of interference with Article 8 rights had to be exceptionally serious before they could outweigh the importance of extradition. The claimant’s family, employment and life in the United Kingdom did not make extradition disproportionate.
4. The abuse-of-process allegation was considered under the principles stated in R (Government of United States of America) v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court [2007] 1 WLR 1157. The allegation had to identify the conduct with particularity, show that it was capable of constituting an abuse, and establish reasonable grounds for believing that it occurred. The Hungarian authority’s explanations showed that the indictment was filed within a reasonable time, custody was unavailable, and the earlier warrant was not required to be included in the later warrant application. Bad faith and deliberate misleading were not established.
5. The court was entitled to admit the new evidence. Nevertheless, although it might have led the district judge to decide a question differently, it did not show that the district judge would have been required to order discharge under section 27(4)(c).
6. A category 1 Convention country is generally presumed to respect Article 6 and other Convention obligations. Strong evidence is required to displace that presumption or establish bad faith. Proper deference is also due to the extradition judge’s factual and credibility findings.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal against the district judge’s extradition order.
2. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: on 26 August 2009, the district judge ordered extradition to Hungary.