USK Valley Conservation Group & Ors, R (on the application of) v Brecon Beacons National Park & Ors

A planning permission is invalid where it authorises development materially different from that described in the application, or where the application is so ambiguous that its essential scope cannot be determined objectively. A planning authority must make reasonable and focused enquiries into facts essential to its decision, particularly the scale of an existing use. Public notices must describe the proposal clearly enough to enable meaningful consultation. Where a Schedule 2 development may have significant environmental effects, the authority must address screening before granting permission. In deciding whether discontinuance under section 102 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is expedient, the authority may consider the fact and approximate amount of compensation, together with the public advantages and disadvantages of the available courses. The permission was quashed, although the challenge to the later enforcement and discontinuance decisions largely failed.

The claimants sought judicial review of a planning permission granted by Brecon Beacons National Park Authority for the relocation of an existing camping facility from a flood zone at Gilestone Farm. They also challenged later decisions concerning enforcement and possible discontinuance of the use.

The permission was expressed by reference to an application describing the development only as relocation of an existing camping facility. Its conditions nevertheless authorised up to 50 tents and 50 caravans. The central issues were whether caravans formed part of the application, whether the application sufficiently identified the scale of the proposed use, whether the authority made adequate enquiries and consultation, whether environmental-impact screening was required, and whether the later decisions were unlawful because of financial considerations or apparent bias.

1. The planning permission was quashed. The application documents, read objectively and as a whole, focused on relocating a tented facility. Caravans were not identified on the form or plans and appeared only in isolated and uncertain references in the supporting statement. A permission authorising 50 caravans was therefore for a different development, or for more than had been applied for.
2. “Existing facility” meant the routinely experienced scale of the existing use, not the potential capacity of the land or an undefined lawfully established use. If the expression bore those different possible meanings, the application was legally uncertain at its heart. Conditions could not cure that uncertainty by defining the essential nature or scale of the proposal.
3. The authority failed in its duty to make reasonable enquiries sufficient to provide a rational basis for decision-making. It should have obtained focused evidence from the applicant, landowner, local residents and the Community Council about the existing level of use. The enquiries made were perfunctory and the permission was invalid on that ground.
4. The consultation and notification process was inadequate. The short description was misleading if the proposal involved a substantial increase over the existing use. The resulting failure deprived consultees of the opportunity to make relevant representations and meant that material considerations were not properly taken into account.
5. The proposal met the threshold for Schedule 2 development under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999. The authority was required to address screening and record whether significant environmental effects were likely. It did neither. The omission independently invalidated the permission.
6. The Delegated Panel had not itself granted permission. Its function was to decide whether the matter should be referred to the Planning Committee or left to an officer. The challenge based on lack of power therefore failed. Errors concerning the applicant’s identity were also inconsequential procedural irregularities and did not invalidate the application.
7. For section 102 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, “expediency” permits consideration of the public advantages and disadvantages of available action, including the fact and likely amount of statutory compensation. The court declined to follow Alnwick DC v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, so far as it excluded those consequences. The November 2008 decision to pursue enforcement first and defer discontinuance was lawful, save that reliance on the unsupported highest valuation was legally flawed.
8. The apparent-bias challenge failed. Political responsibility, a desire to vindicate an earlier view, or concern about criticism did not establish the relevant personal or prejudicial interest in local-authority decision-making.

First-instance judicial review proceedings in the High Court (Administrative Court). The judgment itself records no appeal.