Leeds Group Plc v Leeds City Council

For a Class C town or village green under section 22(1A) of the Commons Registration Act 1965, as amended, qualifying use may come from inhabitants of more than one neighbourhood within one or more localities. The statutory concepts of “neighbourhood” and “locality” are deliberately flexible and do not require the technical characteristics of a common-law locality. A neighbourhood is an ordinary, fact-sensitive concept. Sufficient cohesiveness is relevant, but the court should not impose rigid requirements concerning administrative status, community facilities or perfectly rational boundaries. The amended provision does not retain a predominance requirement. In section 14 proceedings, the High Court exercises an original jurisdiction to reach a just and fully informed decision and may consider evidence beyond that before the registration authority.

The claimant owned part of Yeadon Banks. The defendant, which owned the remainder and was also the registration authority, accepted an inspector’s recommendation that the whole area be registered as a Class C town or village green. The claimant challenged the registration under section 14 of the Commons Registration Act 1965 and by judicial review.

The central issues were whether the users came from a qualifying neighbourhood or neighbourhoods within a locality, whether the use was “as of right”, and the scope of the court’s jurisdiction under section 14. The section 14 claim was tried first and was determinative of the judicial review claim.

1. Section 14 jurisdiction. The court’s jurisdiction under section 14 of the Commons Registration Act 1965 is not appellate. The court may adopt the procedure best calculated to reach a just and fully informed decision, admit further evidence, consider the inspector’s findings, and take account of its own view of the land.
2. Locality. The amendment made by the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 was intended to make Class C registrations easier and to weaken their links with common-law technicalities. In a case concerning a neighbourhood within a locality, “locality” need not be a current administrative unit known to the common law. Yeadon was a sufficiently defined locality. The parish of St Andrew would have been an alternative locality, and the fact that two houses may have fallen outside its boundary was de minimis.
3. Neighbourhood. There is no statutory requirement that there be only one qualifying neighbourhood. The Haws and Banksfield could each qualify. “Neighbourhood” is deliberately imprecise and remains an ordinary English word. Cohesiveness is a relevant consideration, but no rigid test concerning community facilities, naming, estate-agent practice or perfectly rational boundaries should be imposed. Each area had sufficient cohesiveness, having regard to its housing character, interconnected streets, naming and relationship to Yeadon Banks.
4. Predominance and “as of right”. Section 22(1A) requires a significant number of inhabitants of a qualifying neighbourhood or locality to have used the land for at least 20 years and, where required, to continue doing so. It does not require most users to come from one neighbourhood. The claimant could not rely on the pre-2001 law or on Lord Walker’s observations in R (Lewis) v Redcar & Cleveland BC (No 2) to show that use before the 2000 amendment was not “as of right”.
5. The registration of Yeadon Banks was correct. The section 14 proceedings and the judicial review claim were dismissed.

First-instance decision. The judgment records parallel section 14 and judicial review proceedings, with the section 14 proceedings tried first. Both claims were dismissed.