Jones v South East Surrey Local Justice Area

A magistrates’ court has a limited common-law power to revisit an earlier pre-trial order where this is in the interests of justice. Relevant changed circumstances include both objectively changed facts and existing circumstances that were not previously brought to the court’s attention. The interests of justice are assessed in light of the Criminal Procedure Rules’ Overriding Objective, including efficient and expeditious case management, fairness and the proper interests of defendants, witnesses and victims. A renewed application must not become a means of correcting inadequate preparation. Where material information becomes clearer, the case remains current and the interests of justice favour reconsideration, a differently constituted bench may reverse the earlier decision.

The claimant faced a burglary charge in the magistrates’ court. The prosecution’s case depended on DNA evidence that was unavailable shortly before trial. On 13 July 2009 one bench refused the prosecution’s application to adjourn. On the following day, a differently constituted bench granted a renewed application after receiving fuller information about the case, including the likely availability of the DNA evidence and the fact that responsibility for the delay lay with the police.

The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that there had been no relevant change of circumstances and that the second bench had impermissibly reached a different decision on the same facts. The central issue was the extent to which magistrates may revisit an earlier pre-trial decision.

1. The application for judicial review was dismissed. The second bench was entitled to grant the adjournment.

2. The common-law rule recognised in R v Newham Juvenile Court ex p E (a minor) [1986] 1 WLR 939 remained applicable to decisions outside the statutory scheme governing binding pre-trial rulings. A lower court has a limited power to revisit and revoke an earlier order where this is in the interests of justice, particularly where there has been a relevant change of circumstances.

3. Relevant changed circumstances are not confined to objectively new events. They include circumstances that existed when the first decision was made but were not then drawn to the court’s attention. The court approved the emphasis in R (Acton Youth Court) ex p Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 Crim LR 75 on the efficacious administration of justice and the need for a strict approach to repeated reconsideration.

4. The interests of justice are informed by the Overriding Objective in the Criminal Procedure Rules. Relevant considerations include efficient and expeditious case management, fairness to the prosecution and defence, the rights and interests of defendants, witnesses and victims, the gravity and complexity of the case, and the consequences of delay.

5. The statutory provisions concerning binding pre-trial rulings in sections 8A and 8B of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 apply to matters within section 8A(4), such as admissibility of evidence and questions of law. An application to vacate a trial date by adjourning the case is not naturally within that statutory description. The common-law rule therefore remained relevant to adjournment applications.

6. In the present case, the second bench received materially clearer information: responsibility for the missing DNA evidence was attributed to the police rather than the prosecution, and the likely timetable for obtaining the evidence was explained. The matter was still current because the trial was listed for the same day. These circumstances, taken with the Overriding Objective, justified reconsideration and the adjournment.

7. The decision did not encourage deficient initial applications. Participants in the criminal justice system must prepare and present applications efficiently, and courts should not tolerate repeated reconsideration caused by poor preparation.

The judgment concerned judicial review of a decision by the Redhill Magistrates’ Court. One bench refused an adjournment application on 13 July 2009. A differently constituted bench granted a renewed application on 14 July 2009. The Administrative Court upheld the later decision.