Craik, Chief Constable of Northumbria Police, R (on the application of) v Newcastle Upon Tyne Magistrates' Court

A magistrates’ court has a judicial discretion to refuse a summons, or later stay proceedings, where a private prosecution is vexatious or an abuse of process. The statutory duty to send an indictable case to the Crown Court does not remove that jurisdiction, although the power will rarely be exercised.

There is generally no criminal vicarious liability at common law. A person is criminally liable only as a principal or secondary party, unless an exceptional category applies. Proceedings against a person with no factual or legal foundation are vexatious and abusive. Where that is established, the magistrates’ court should stop the proceedings.

The claimant, the recently retired Chief Constable of Northumbria Police, sought judicial review of decisions by Newcastle upon Tyne Magistrates’ Court concerning a private prosecution brought by Simon Jason Price.

The District Judge issued a summons alleging false imprisonment, declined to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process, and sent the Chief Constable to the Crown Court under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The alleged imprisonment arose from a failure to review Mr Price’s detention within the statutory period. The central issue was whether the Chief Constable could be criminally liable for the acts or omissions of subordinate officers without evidence of personal participation, assistance, direction or consent.

1. Judicial review allowed. The issue of the summons against the Chief Constable and the decision sending him for trial were quashed.
2. False imprisonment is a common law offence requiring unlawful and intentional or reckless restraint. It is triable only on indictment, so section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 applied.
3. The issue of a summons is a judicial function. A magistrates’ court may refuse to issue one where the proposed proceedings are vexatious, improper or an abuse of process. It may also stay proceedings at a later stage. The section 51 duty to send an indictable case to the Crown Court does not remove that jurisdiction, although a stay will be rare.
4. There was no general doctrine of criminal vicarious liability at common law. The principle in R v Huggins remained applicable: a superior is generally civilly liable for a subordinate’s acts but is not criminally liable without personal participation, command, direction, consent or equivalent involvement. The limited anomalous exceptions were irrelevant.
5. Even assuming that the detention review had been unlawfully omitted, and that the responsible officers were liable in tort and criminally, there was no evidence that the Chief Constable acted as principal or secondary party. The proposed prosecution therefore had no factual or legal foundation and was necessarily vexatious and an abuse of process.
6. In those exceptional circumstances, the District Judge’s discretion could only properly be exercised by refusing the summons, staying the proceedings and declining to send the Chief Constable for trial.
7. The separate allegation that Mr Price had an ulterior motive was not determined. It was unnecessary to the result and, insofar as it concerned the other officers, was better left to the Crown Court.

• Newcastle upon Tyne Magistrates’ Court: issued a summons against the Chief Constable, declined to stay the proceedings, and sent him for trial under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the judicial review claim and quashed the issue of the summons and the decision sending the Chief Constable for trial.