Rosalind Ramroop v John Ishmael and Lall Heerasingh

A claimant may acquire title by adverse possession to a physically defined part of a building. The claimant must plead that part precisely, prove that it was capable of exclusive possession, and establish actual exclusive possession throughout the limitation period. Under section 9 of the Real Property Limitation Act, an oral periodic tenancy ends for limitation purposes after the first unpaid rent period, but the provision does not remove the requirement of actual, exclusive possession. A tenant in common has a right to possess the whole property. The appeal failed because the alternative claim to part of the building was neither pleaded nor proved.

The appellant claimed title by adverse possession to a dwelling-house at 22 Union Road, Marabella, against persons asserting freehold title. Her case initially relied on long occupation, but the evidence established that she had been a tenant of part of the property and that other occupants remained tenants. The trial judge rejected the adverse possession claim and made a separate award for improvements. The Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed the appeal and upheld the order for possession. Before the Privy Council, the central issues were the effect of the limitation provisions, whether adverse possession could establish title to part of a building, and whether that case had been properly pleaded and proved.

The appeal was dismissed. Lord Walker delivered the judgment of the Board.

1. Limitation and periodic tenancy. Section 3 of the Real Property Limitation Act provides the general 16-year limitation period for recovery of land. Section 9 supplies a special rule for an oral periodic tenancy: where rent is unpaid and remains unpaid, time runs from the end of the first rent period in which rent was not paid. The appellant’s monthly tenancy was therefore treated as ending one month after the last period for which rent was paid in June 1977.
2. Exclusive possession. Section 9 only removes the objection that possession by a tenant cannot be adverse to the landlord. The claimant must still prove actual and exclusive possession of the property claimed throughout the limitation period. The Board applied that principle, referring to Ramnarace v Lutchman [2001] 1 WLR 1651.
3. Part of a building. The Court of Appeal’s broad proposition that possessory title necessarily relates to land as a whole was rejected. Land may be owned in horizontal layers, and adverse possession may in principle relate to part only of a building. The Board referred to Rains v Buxton (1880) 14 Ch D 537 and Simpson v Fergus (2000) 79 P & CR 398.
4. Requirements for a partial claim. A claimant seeking title to part of a building must precisely define the part in the pleadings, provide credible evidence that it was capable of exclusive possession apart from the claimant’s licensees, and prove actual exclusive possession throughout the limitation period.
5. Tenancy in common. Where there is a legal tenancy in common, each tenant in common has a right to possession of the whole property. The limitation period could not therefore be extended on the basis that a co-owner’s estate was joined later, as confirmed by Jacobs v Seward (1872) LR 5 HL 464 and Bull v Bull [1955] 1 QB 234.
6. The appellant had not pleaded a precise alternative claim to part of the house. The evidence did not establish the layout or exclusive control of any defined part, and Lystra Parfitt remained a tenant. The respondents, though unrepresented before the Board, were entitled to any allowable costs incurred.

• Privy Council: Appeal dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay any allowable costs incurred by the respondents.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: Appeal dismissed and order for possession upheld. No citation is stated in the judgment.
• Trial court: Jamadar J rejected the claim to possessory title and awarded compensation for improvements, with no cross-appeal concerning that award.