Seeromani Maraj-Naraynsingh v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and The Director of Public Prosecutions (Trinidad and Tobago)

Section 5(2)(c)(iii) of the Constitution requires a person to be brought promptly before an appropriate judicial authority upon initial arrest or detention. It does not impose a continuing or renewed obligation when a magistrate later commits the defendant for trial, and it does not require the prompt filing of an indictment after committal. The deliberate omission of the express entitlement in article 5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial reinforces that interpretation. Whether the Constitution contains a broader implied right to trial within a reasonable time was left open.

The appellant was arrested and detained on a murder charge, committed to stand trial by a magistrate, and remanded because murder was non-bailable. The indictment was filed several months after committal. She sought judicial review, declarations and damages, alleging that the delay breached section 5(2)(c)(iii) of the Constitution. She was tried and acquitted before the claim was determined.

Pemberton J dismissed the claim, and the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed the appeal. Before the Board, the appellant confined her case to section 5(2)(c)(iii), arguing that it required prompt filing of the indictment and prompt trial after committal. The central issue was the temporal scope of that constitutional guarantee.

The Board, in the single judgment delivered by Lord Mance, dismissed the appeal.

1. Constitutional and Convention context. Section 5(2)(c)(iii) was compared with article 5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The constitutional text omitted the Convention’s express entitlement to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial. That omission was deliberate. The first part of article 5(3), which corresponds to section 5(2)(c)(iii), is tied to the initial arrest or detention contemplated by article 5(1)(c) (paras [14]–[16]).
2. Meaning of promptly. In Brogan v United Kingdom (1988) 11 EHRR 117, the European Court of Human Rights explained the word as carrying a constraining connotation of immediacy. It is distinct from the less strict requirement concerning the period before trial. The Board considered that interpretation consistent with Grauzinis v Lithuania (2000) 35 EHRR 7, where a complaint about not being repeatedly brought before a judge after initial production fell under article 5(4), not article 5(3) (paras [16]–[17]).
3. Temporal scope. Section 5(2)(c)(iii) relates to a single time. Its obligation arises upon initial arrest or detention and neither continues throughout detention nor arises anew upon a magistrate’s subsequent committal for trial. The structure of section 5(2)(c) supports this reading: some rights are triggered initially but other elements, such as communication with legal advisers and habeas corpus relief, may continue thereafter (paras [17]–[18]).
4. Unresolved wider issue and disposition. The Board did not decide whether the Constitution might contain, by necessary implication, a separate right to trial within a reasonable time. That issue was unnecessary because the appeal was confined to section 5(2)(c)(iii). The appeal was dismissed accordingly (paras [12], [14], [19]).

• Privy Council: Appeal dismissed on 21 July 2010.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: Appeal dismissed from the judgment of Pemberton J.
• Pemberton J: Judicial review claim for declarations and damages dismissed on 14 February 2007.