Noel Campbell v The Queen (Jamaica)

The constitutional provision preserving Privy Council special-leave jurisdiction does not itself grant or restrict that jurisdiction. The statutory powers under the Judicial Committee Acts 1833 and 1844 are broad enough to permit special leave where a domestic Court of Appeal has refused leave to hear an appeal. The rule in Lane v Esdaile [1891] AC 210 does not apply to applications for special leave to the Privy Council, although domestic refusal remains relevant and may be decisive. Identification directions need convey the essential caution required by R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224, but no fixed form of words is required. Omission of a good-character direction is assessed by its impact. It may render a verdict unsafe where the accused gives sworn evidence and credibility effectively stands alone.

The appellant was convicted of murder after a retrial before Pitter J and a jury in Jamaica. A single judge and then the Court of Appeal of Jamaica refused leave to appeal. The appellant was unrepresented at the latter hearing and later sought special leave from the Privy Council.

The Board considered whether it had jurisdiction to grant special leave despite the domestic refusal, and whether defects in the identification directions and the absence of a good-character direction made the conviction unsafe. The absence of the good-character direction was attributed to defence counsel’s incompetence.

1. Jurisdiction and special leave. The Board held that section 110(3) of the Constitution of Jamaica preserves, rather than grants, the existing power to grant special leave. The approach in Grant v The Queen [2004] UKPC 27 was correct and was followed; the contrary approach in Williams (Kervin) v The Queen [1997] AC 624 was not followed. Sections 3 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 and 1 of the Judicial Committee Act 1844 use language broad enough to cover an order refusing leave to appeal.
2. The rule in Lane v Esdaile [1891] AC 210, developed in the context of domestic appellate structures, did not restrict applications for special leave to the Privy Council. The domestic refusal remained a relevant, and often decisive, consideration when deciding whether leave should actually be granted.
3. Identification. The essential features of the Turnbull direction were required, but no precise form of words was necessary. The trial judge did not clearly separate truthfulness from the possibility of mistake and did not deal with every suggested weakness in the desired manner. Nevertheless, the jury could not have been in doubt that it had to consider both Mr Anglin’s credibility and the reliability of his identification. The defects did not make the trial unfair or the verdict unsafe.
4. Good character and counsel’s incompetence. The Board ordinarily would not entertain a first-time allegation of counsel’s incompetence. It could do so where the appellant was unrepresented below and the material enabled the issue to be resolved reliably. The evidence showed that the failure to raise good character was attributable to counsel’s incompetence.
5. A good-character direction is not invariably decisive. Its significance depends on the nature of the offence, the issues, and the other evidence. Here, however, the appellant gave sworn evidence and the credibility and reliability of his denial stood effectively alone against the identification evidence. The omission deprived him of a benefit of particular potential importance and the Board could not treat it as irrelevant to the safety of the verdict.
6. The Board granted special leave, allowed the appeal, and humbly advised that the case be remitted to the Court of Appeal of Jamaica with a direction to quash the jury’s verdict and determine whether to order a retrial.

• Privy Council: Special leave granted. Appeal allowed. The case was remitted to the Court of Appeal of Jamaica with a direction to quash the jury’s verdict and determine whether to order a retrial.
• Court of Appeal of Jamaica: A single judge refused leave on 18 August 2003. The Court of Appeal refused the renewed application on 21 October 2003.
• Trial court: Following an earlier retrial, Pitter J and a jury convicted the appellant of murder on 10 April 2002.