Mousa, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Defence & Anor

[2011] EWCA Civ 1334

Case details

Case citations
[2011] EWCA Civ 1334
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
22 November 2011
Judgment text

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Subjects
Public law Human rights Article 3 investigative obligation
Keywords
Article 3 investigative obligation independent investigation practical independence public inquiry systemic abuse wait and see detainee ill-treatment public perception
Outcome
appeal allowed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Article 3 requires an investigation that is independent, effective and reasonably prompt, but does not prescribe a public inquiry in every case. Independence is assessed by the practical reality of the arrangements, not only formal command structures. Public perception of possible unconscious bias matters, so actual proof of partiality is unnecessary. Systemic issues closely connected with individual ill-treatment allegations may fall within the investigative obligation. However, a wait and see policy cannot rely on a preliminary investigation that lacks the required independence.

Factual background

The appellant represented more than 140 Iraqi detainees who alleged ill-treatment by British Armed Forces between 2003 and 2008. The Secretary of State declined to establish an immediate public inquiry, relying on the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, a separate review panel, and existing Baha Mousa and Al-Sweady inquiries. The Divisional Court, in [2010] EWHC 3304 (Admin), held that IHAT was sufficiently independent and that postponing a decision on a wider inquiry was lawful. The appeal concerned IHAT’s practical independence, the relevance of systemic allegations, and whether the Secretary of State could lawfully await the existing processes before deciding how the Article 3 obligation should be met.

Held

The appeal was allowed. The Secretary of State was required to reconsider how the investigative obligation under Article 3 should be satisfied.

  1. Applicable standard. An Article 3 investigation must be independent, effective and reasonably prompt. The European Court of Human Rights in Jordan v United Kingdom stated that independence requires freedom from hierarchical and institutional connections with those implicated, as well as practical independence: (2003) 37 EHRR 2. The purposes of an investigation, including exposing culpable conduct, correcting dangerous practices and learning lessons, were described in R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: [2004] 1 AC 653.
  2. Independence and perception. The assessment focuses on the reality of the arrangements. The claimant did not need to prove that any investigator was actually partial. Public perception of the possibility of unconscious bias was relevant, following Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd: [2003] ICR 856. The court also noted that the same principle had been adopted in R (JL) v Secretary of State for Justice: [2009] EWHC 2416 (Admin).
  3. IHAT. IHAT lacked the requisite practical independence. Members of the Provost Branch were investigating allegations concerning detention arrangements in which Provost Branch personnel had held important advisory, training, processing and custodial responsibilities. Those allegations could call into question the conduct of RMP, GPD, SIB and MPS personnel, as well as the PM(A), to whom IHAT was required to report. Formal command arrangements did not answer that concern. The extensive recusal arrangements confirmed, rather than cured, the problem.
  4. IHAP and timing. IHAP could not remedy IHAT’s lack of independence because its source material came from IHAT and its membership included bodies potentially exposed to criticism. Systemic issues closely related to individual allegations could fall within Article 3, but they did not automatically require an immediate public inquiry. A wait and see approach might be permissible while an independent preliminary investigation was pending. Once IHAT was found not to be independent, it could not be relied upon as the principal reason for postponing the decision. The limited terms of the Baha Mousa Inquiry and the resource implications did not justify postponement across the broader allegations.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) allowed the appeal and directed the Secretary of State to reconsider how the Article 3 investigative obligation should be satisfied.
  2. Administrative Court in [2010] EWHC 3304 (Admin) held that IHAT was sufficiently independent and that the Secretary of State’s wait and see approach was legally permissible.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Outcome:
appeal allowed

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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