HH Sant Baba Jeet Singh Ji Maharaj v Eastern Media Group and Anor

The court has a discretionary power to order security for the costs of an appeal where the claimant is resident outside the jurisdiction and outside the specified protected states. Satisfaction of the procedural condition makes an order possible, but does not make it automatic.

Relevant considerations include the likely delay and difficulty in recovering costs, the foreign law position, the character and reduced scope of the appeal, and fairness to the claimant. The amount and time for providing security must also be fair. Security may therefore be ordered where the remaining appeal is peripheral to the action’s original issues, even though the surviving allegations remain substantial.

This was an interlocutory libel action brought by the claimant, the leader of a Sikh sect, against a media organisation and the journalist responsible for an article. The claim against the media organisation had settled. Permission to appeal had been granted concerning allegations that the journalist had portrayed the claimant as a cult leader, linked him to disturbances and sexual exploitation, alleged dishonesty concerning trust deeds, and alleged conduct contrary to the Sikh community’s interests.

On an earlier strike-out application, Eady J had held that the claimant’s status as the duly chosen and anointed leader of the sect was not justiciable. That ruling was not challenged. The remaining defendant applied for security for the costs of the pending appeal. The central issue was whether security should be ordered, and if so in what amount and by what deadline.

1. Application granted. The power to order security for the costs of an appeal arose under Civil Procedure Rules Part 25.15, which referred the court to Part 25.30 for the relevant conditions. Rule 25.13(2)(a) supplied a condition because the claimant was resident outside the jurisdiction and was not resident in a Brussels contracting state, a state covered by the Lugano Convention, or a regulation state. That condition made security possible, but did not require it.
2. The exercise of the power remained a matter of judgment and discretion. The evidence indicated that any costs order would probably face a delay of about six years before recovery could be attempted, and that recovery under Indian law might be difficult where judgment had not been given on the merits. The latter consideration was not fatal, although it was capable of operating both ways.
3. The narrowed scope of the appeal supported an order. The principal issues on which the action had originally been launched had fallen away permanently. The matters remaining for appeal were not insignificant, but were marginal in relation to the action as originally brought.
4. The sum sought, slightly below £300,000, was high but could be realistic in light of the proceedings’ trajectory. A lesser sum was fairer and gave the claimant sufficient time to comply. The claimant was ordered to pay £250,000 into the court funds office within 14 days. Both sides were given liberty to apply, with any urgent application to be listed before Sedley LJ if possible.
5. Pitchford LJ agreed with Sedley LJ. The formal order was that the application be granted.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): granted the application for security for the costs of the pending appeal and ordered payment of £250,000 into court within 14 days.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Eady J held on a strike-out application that the question whether the claimant was the duly chosen and anointed leader of the Sikh sect was not justiciable. No appeal was brought against that ruling. No citation for the decision is stated in the judgment.