Ilott v Mitson & Ors

Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, an adult child is not subject to an additional threshold requiring proof of moral obligation or special circumstances. The court must evaluate all relevant statutory factors and make a value judgment on whether reasonable financial provision has been made for maintenance.

Financial need alone is not determinative, but neither may the court impose a judicial gloss on the statutory scheme. State benefits do not make complete exclusion reasonable. An appellate court should not substitute its own assessment for the first-instance value judgment unless the judge applied the wrong principle or reached a plainly wrong conclusion.

The appellant, the only child of the deceased, was excluded from her mother’s will. The estate passed to animal and bird charities. A district judge found that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision for the appellant’s maintenance and awarded her £50,000.

The charities cross-appealed. Eleanor King J allowed their cross-appeal and dismissed the appellant’s claim, holding that the district judge had erred in law and in evaluating the statutory factors. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The central issues were whether the district judge had asked the correct statutory question and whether his value judgment was plainly wrong.

1. Appeal allowed. The Court of Appeal, in the unanimous judgments of Sir Nicholas Wall P, Arden LJ and Black LJ, held that the district judge had correctly addressed the threshold question under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The question was whether the disposition produced an objectively unreasonable result, not whether the deceased had acted unreasonably.
2. The statutory inquiry has two stages. The court first determines whether reasonable financial provision has been made, having regard to section 3. Only if the provision is inadequate does it exercise the discretion under section 2 as to whether, and in what manner, relief should be granted.
3. The threshold determination is a value judgment or qualitative decision, not an exercise of discretion. An appellate court must not interfere merely because it would have evaluated the factors differently. Intervention requires an error of principle, misapplication of the facts to the law, or a conclusion that is plainly wrong. The High Court had therefore erred by substituting its own evaluation.
4. An adult child is in no different position from any other applicant. The Act does not require proof of a moral obligation, special circumstances, or any other single essential factor. The court must assess the relevance and weight of all the section 3 factors. Need and earning capacity are important considerations, but neither creates an additional statutory hurdle.
5. The district judge was not required to conduct a formally separate balancing exercise before deciding the threshold issue. It was sufficient that, read as a whole, his judgment considered the statutory factors and explained the resulting value judgment. His findings concerning the appellant’s financial circumstances, family life, work prospects, the size of the estate, the charities’ lack of competing needs and the deceased’s conduct were sufficient.
6. Arden LJ additionally confirmed that reliance on state benefits did not make complete exclusion reasonable. The appellant’s decision to remain at home and raise her family did not itself justify exclusion, although it could be relevant to quantification of maintenance. The appeal concerning quantum was directed to be heard by a different Family Division judge, with the court encouraging settlement.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed. The decision of Eleanor King J was reversed, and the appellant’s appeal on quantum was directed to be heard by a different judge.
2. High Court, Family Division: In [2009] EWHC 3114 (Fam), also reported at [2010] 1 FLR 1613, Eleanor King J allowed the charities’ cross-appeal and dismissed the appellant’s claim.
3. District judge: On 7 August 2007, the district judge held that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision and awarded the appellant £50,000.