Golubovich v Golubovich

Permission to apply under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 is a gateway to a substantive process. An appeal against permission is difficult unless the judge was misled or made an obvious error of fact or law. Case-management decisions, including adjournments, attract substantial appellate restraint. Where a party deliberately fails to provide full, frank and clear disclosure, the court may draw reasonable inferences about resources and make an award partly on informed speculation. A judgment may be read as a whole when assessing whether the statutory factors and evidential basis were adequately addressed.

The parties’ marriage lasted 18 months and produced a daughter. The husband obtained a Russian divorce, which was ultimately recognised in England. The wife therefore sought permission to make a Part III application under the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.

Moylan J granted permission, refused the husband’s application for an adjournment, and later ordered him to pay the wife £2.485 million for accommodation and maintenance, together with £350,000 in costs. The husband appealed, arguing that Russia was the more appropriate venue, that the adjournment refusal was unfair, and that the lump-sum order lacked a reliable evidential basis.

The issues were whether permission should have been granted, whether the adjournment decision was plainly wrong, and whether the financial award fell outside the judge’s discretion.

1. Appeals dismissed. The orders granting permission under Part III, refusing an adjournment, and awarding a lump sum and costs were upheld.
2. An appeal against permission to bring a Part III application is extremely difficult. Applying the approach emphasised in Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] UKSC 13, success ordinarily requires that the judge was misled or made an obvious error of fact or law. Where the issue is discretionary, the judge below is entitled to substantial appellate support.
3. The grant of permission was inevitable in the circumstances. Recognition of the Russian decree left the wife to pursue the Part III route. The challenge based on the statutory venue assessment could not succeed.
4. The refusal of an adjournment was a pragmatic case-management decision. The judge had managed the proceedings for some time, knew the history of delay, and was entitled to avoid further postponement in an overcrowded list.
5. The financial order fell within the judge’s broad discretion. The judgment, read as a whole, supported inferences that the husband conducted sophisticated international business activities, concealed their extent, and continued to receive substantial parental support. His inadequate disclosure justified an award partly based on informed speculation and protection of the wife’s essential needs.
6. The English and Russian connections were more finely balanced than the first-instance judge had expressly stated, and the source of payment could have been identified more explicitly. Those matters did not take the decision outside the permissible ambit of discretion. Enforcement difficulties existed in either jurisdiction and did not alter the result.

The appeals against the orders of 14 July and 16 August were dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeals against Moylan J’s orders of 14 July and 16 August 2010 dismissed.
• Principal Registry of the Family Division: Moylan J granted permission for the wife to proceed under Part III, refused an adjournment, and made financial and costs orders.
• Earlier proceedings: Singer J’s refusal to recognise the Russian decree was reversed by the Court of Appeal, enabling the wife to pursue Part III relief.