Q, R. v

An offence under section 1(3A) of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 requires the defendant’s actual participation. It does not impose vicarious criminal liability on a landlord for acts done by relatives or others. Liability as a secondary party, including through joint enterprise, incitement or conspiracy, remains possible where the evidence and allegation support it.

On a prosecutor’s appeal against a ruling of no case to answer, a challenge to the merits succeeds only if the ruling was perverse. The appellate court will not substitute its assessment merely because the prosecution identifies evidential allegations capable of separate consideration.

The Peterborough City Council appealed under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 against a terminating ruling made by the Recorder at Peterborough Crown Court. The respondent faced two remaining counts under section 1(3A) of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, alleging conduct likely to interfere with the peace or comfort of residential occupiers and likely to cause them to leave or refrain from exercising rights.

The prosecution relied on disconnected services, demands to leave, and the respondent’s family moving into the house. Much of the alleged conduct was said to have been carried out by the respondent’s son or other family members. The Recorder ruled that there was no case to answer. The central issues were whether section 1(3A) permitted vicarious liability and whether the Recorder’s ruling was perverse.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Recorder was correct to hold that a defendant could not be convicted under section 1(3A) of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 solely on a basis of vicarious liability. The statutory phrase requiring the landlord or agent to do acts points to actual participation by the defendant.
2. The mental element reinforces that construction. The prosecution must prove that the defendant knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that the conduct was likely to cause the residential occupier to leave or to refrain from exercising a right or remedy. That is a state of mind on the defendant’s part, not a basis for imposing liability merely because another person acted on his behalf.
3. The reference to both a landlord and an agent indicates that, where an agent carries out the impugned acts, the agent may commit the offence. It does not make the landlord vicariously guilty. The court drew support from R v Phekoo (1981) 73 Cr App R 107, which held that section 1(3) did not create strict liability. The change from “calculated” to “likely” did not alter that conclusion. Nor could the reverse burden in section 1(2) be imported into section 1(3A).
4. This conclusion did not exclude liability as a secondary party through joint enterprise, incitement, or conspiracy on appropriate evidence. No such case had been alleged.
5. Applying the Wednesbury test, the court held that a prosecutor’s merits appeal against a no-case ruling could succeed only if the ruling was perverse. The Recorder’s evaluation of the evidence about services and the family’s occupation was not perverse. The respondent was therefore acquitted.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The prosecution’s appeal under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was dismissed and an acquittal was ordered.
• Peterborough Crown Court. On 14 January 2011, the Recorder ruled that there was no case to answer on the two remaining section 1(3A) counts under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.